Japonya’nın Batılılaşması:
Etik Olmaksızın Ekonomi
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Japonya’nın Batılılaşması: Etik Olmaksızın Ekonomi


1853’te ABD Komodoru (bir tür filo komutanı) Matthew Perry Mississippi, Plymouth, Saratoga ve Susquehanna savaş gemileri ile Edo (Tokyo) yakınlarındaki Uraga’ya ulaştı. Görevi Japonya’nın 220 yıllık yalıtılma politikasına (sakoku) son vererek Japon limanlarını Amerika ile tecime açmaktı. Japon hükümetine istenenleri bildiren bir mektup bırakarak bir yıl sona geri dönmek üzere ayrıldı. Rusların, İngilizlerin ve Fransızların erken bir hamlesini önlemek için, altı ay sonra 1854 Şubatında 10 savaş gemisi ve 1.600 asker ile döndü. Bir ay süren görüşmelerden sonra Kanagawa Anlaşması imzalandı. Japonlar henüz özsel olarak ortaçağ teknolojisi ile donatılı kuvvetlerinin Amerikalılar ile başa çıkamayacağını anlamak zorunda kaldılar. Perry’nin seferini izleyen on yıl içinde Japonya’nın yalıtılmışlığı sona erdi, Japonya ve Batının Büyük Güçleri arasında diplomatik ilişkiler kuruldu, 268 yıllık Tokugawa Shogunluğu çöktü, ve Meiji Restorasyonu ile bir imparatorluk düzenine geçildi.

 

 

   

Perry Japonya’ya gelen ilk Batılı değildi. Portekiz, İspanyol ve Hollandalı tecimciler 16 ve 17'nci yüzyıllarda Japonya ile düzenli tecim ilişkileri sürdürüyorlardı. İberyalıların Japonya'yı Katolikliğe döndürmede diretmelerinin ve haksız tecim ilişkilerine yönelmelerinin sonuçları iyi olmadı. 1639’da Hollandalılar dışında tüm Batılılar Japonya’dan çıkarıldı ya da gönüllü olarak ülkeden ayrıldılar. Sonraki iki yüzyıl boyunca Japonya yalnızca Çinliler, Koreliler ve Hollandalılar ile tecimsel ilişkiler sürdürdü. Bu daha sonra “kapalı ülke dönemi” olarak adlandırılan dönemdi. İçeri giriş gibi dışarı çıkış da yasaklandı ve daha önce yurt dışına yerleşmiş olan on binlerce Japonun geri dönmesi ölüm cezası gözdağı altında önlendi. Shogunluk okyanus yolculuğuna yetenekli büyük gemilerin yapımını da yasakladı ve varolanlar yok edildi. Batılılar ile ilişki ülkede bir tür ulusal duygunun doğmasına yol açtı.

The United States and the Opening to Japan, 1853 / Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs

The United States and the Opening to Japan, 1853 (LINK)

On July 8, 1853, American Commodore Matthew Perry led his four ships into the harbor at Tokyo Bay, seeking to re-establish for the first time in over 200 years regular trade and discourse between Japan and the western world.

   
Commodore Matthew Perry

Although he is often credited with opening Japan to the western world, Perry was not the first westerner to visit the islands. Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch traders engaged in regular trade with Japan in the 16th and 17th centuries. Persistent attempts by the Europeans to convert the Japanese to Catholicism and their tendency to engage in unfair trading practices led Japan to expel most foreigners in 1639. For the two centuries that followed, Japan limited trade access to Dutch and Chinese ships with special charters.

There were several reasons why the United States became interested in revitalizing contact between Japan and the West in the mid-19th century. First, the combination of the opening of Chinese ports to regular trade and the annexation of California, creating an American port on the Pacific, ensured that there would be a steady stream of maritime traffic between North America and Asia. Then, as American traders in the Pacific replaced sailing ships with steam ships, they needed to secure coaling stations, where they could stop to take on provisions and fuel while making the long trip from the United States to China. The combination of its advantageous geographic position and rumors that Japan held vast deposits of coal increased the appeal of establishing commercial and diplomatic contacts with the Japanese. Additionally, the American whaling industry had pushed into the North Pacific by the mid-18th century, and sought safe harbors, assistance in case of shipwrecks, and reliable supply stations. In the years leading up to the Perry mission, a number of American sailors found themselves shipwrecked and stranded on Japanese shores, and tales of their mistreatment at the hands of the unwelcoming Japanese spread through the merchant community and across the United States.

The same combination of economic considerations and belief in Manifest Destiny that motivated U.S. expansion across the North American continent also drove American merchants and missionaries to journey across the Pacific. At the time, many Americans believed that they had a special responsibility to modernize and civilize the Chinese and Japanese. In the case of Japan, missionaries felt that Protestant Christianity would be accepted where Catholicism had generally been rejected. Other Americans argued that, even if the Japanese were unreceptive to Western ideals, forcing them to interact and trade with the world was a necessity that would ultimately benefit both nations.

Commodore Perry’s mission was not the first American overture to the Japanese. In the 1830s, the Far Eastern squadron of the U.S. Navy sent several missions from its regional base in Guangzhou (Canton), China, but in each case, the Japanese did not permit them to land, and they lacked the authority from the U.S. Government to force the issue. In 1851, President Millard Fillmore authorized a formal naval expedition to Japan to return shipwrecked Japanese sailors and request that Americans stranded in Japan be returned to the United States. He sent Commodore John Aulick to accomplish these tasks, but before Aulick left Guangzhou for Japan, he was relieved of his post and replaced by Commodore Matthew Perry. A lifetime naval officer, Perry had distinguished himself in the Mexican-American War and was instrumental in promoting the United States Navy’s conversion to steam power.

Perry first sailed to the Ryukyus and the Bonin Islands southwest and southeast of the main Japanese islands, claiming territory for the United States, and demanding that the people in both places assist him. He then sailed north to Edo (Tokyo) Bay, carrying a letter from the U.S. President addressed to the Emperor of Japan. By addressing the letter to the Emperor, the United States demonstrated its lack of knowledge about the Japanese government and society. At that time, the Japanese emperor was little more than a figurehead, and the true leadership of Japan was in the hands of the Tokugawa Shogunate.

Perry arrived in Japanese waters with a small squadron of U.S. Navy ships, because he and others believed the only way to convince the Japanese to accept western trade was to display a willingness to use its advanced firepower. At the same time, Perry brought along a variety of gifts for the Japanese Emperor, including a working model of a steam locomotive, a telescope, a telegraph, and a variety of wines and liquors from the West, all intended to impress upon the Japanese the superiority of Western culture. His mission was to complete an agreement with the Japanese Government for the protection of shipwrecked or stranded Americans and to open one or more ports for supplies and refueling. Displaying his audacity and readiness to use force, Perry’s approach into the forbidden waters around Tokyo convinced the Japanese authorities to accept the letter.

The following spring, Perry returned with an even larger squadron to receive Japan’s answer. The Japanese grudgingly agreed to Perry’s demands, and the two sides signed the Treaty of Kanagawa on March 31, 1854. According to the terms of the treaty, Japan would protect stranded seamen and open two ports for refueling and provisioning American ships: Shimoda and Hakodate. Japan also gave the United States the right to appoint consuls to live in these port cities, a privilege not previously granted to foreign nations. This treaty was not a commercial treaty, and it did not guarantee the right to trade with Japan. Still, in addition to providing for distressed American ships in Japanese waters, it contained a most-favored-nation clause, so that all future concessions Japan granted to other foreign powers would also be granted to the United States. As a result, Perry’s treaty provided an opening that would allow future American contact and trade with Japan.

   
Townsend Harris

The first U.S. consul assigned to a Japanese port was Townsend Harris. Like many of the early consuls in Asia, Harris was a New York merchant dealing with Chinese imports. He arrived in Shimoda in 1856, but, lacking the navy squadron that strengthened Perry’s bargaining position, it took Harris far longer to convince the Japanese to sign a more extended treaty. Ultimately, Japanese officials learned of how the British used military action to compel the opening to China, and decided that it was better to open its doors willingly than to be forced to do so. The United States and Japan signed their first true commercial treaty, sometimes called the Harris Treaty, in 1858. The European powers soon followed the U.S. example and drew up their own treaties with Japan. Japan sent its first mission to the West in 1860, when Japanese delegates journeyed to the United States to exchange the ratified Harris Treaty.

Although Japan opened its ports to modern trade only reluctantly, once it did, it took advantage of the new access to modern technological developments. Japan’s opening to the West enabled it to modernize its military, and to rise quickly to the position of the most formidable Asian power in the Pacific. At the same time, the process by which the United States and the Western powers forced Japan into modern commercial intercourse, along with other internal factors, weakened the position of the Tokugawa Shogunate to the point that the shogun fell from power. The Emperor gained formal control of the country in the Meiji Restoration of 1868, with long-term effects for the rule and modernization of Japan.

 



 

Commodor Perry’nin Japonya’ya ilk gelişi

 

   

Perry üç şey istemesi konusunda resmi emir almıştı. Japon kıyılarına yakın yerlerde kazaya uğrayan Amerikan balina avcılarının güvenliği; gemilere başta kömür olmak üzere araç, gereç ve yakıt sağlanması; ve limanların ticarete açılması. 1854 Martında imzalanan Kanagawa Uylaşımı (Convention of Kanagawa) ile Hakodate ve Shimoda limanlarının Birleşik Devletler ile tecime açılması ve Edo'da ilk Amerikan konsolosluğunun kurulması kabul edildi. 1858'de Townsend Harris Japonlara Edo Anlaşmasını kabul ettirdi ve dört liman daha Birleşik Devletler ile tecime açıldı. Bu ilk "eşitsiz anlaşma" idi. Arkadan İngiltere, Rusya, Fransa ve Hollanda ile benzer anlaşmalar yapıldı.

 

Bu "anlaşmalar" Japonya payına gönüllü olarak kabul edilen anlaşmalar değildi. Ve gene de Çin durumunda olduğu gibi bir "küçük düşürülme yüzyılı" tarafından izlenmediler. Tersine, anlaşmalar Japonya'nın hızla gelişmesi ve güçlenmesi sonucunda 1899'da sona erdirildi ve aynı "eşitsiz anlaşmalar" bu kez öncelikle Kore'ye olmak üzerine Japonya tarafından dayatıldı. Batılı İmparatorlukların Japonya'ya dayattıkları "eşitsiz anlaşmalar" Japonya'yı sözde bir modernleşme yoluyla militarizme ve sonunda İkinci Dünya Savaşına doğru güdülendiren başlıca etmenler oldular. Birleşik Devletler'den Rus İmparatorluğuna, İngiliz İmparatorluğuna, Fransa'ya, Hollanda'ya Batılı Güçler ilk "Japon Mucizesi" ile karşılaştılar ve kendileri ile başa çıkabileceğine inanan bir Güç yarattıklarını anladılar.

List of Treatises

List of Treatises (W)

Treaty Year Imposer
English name Japanese name
Convention of Kanagawa 日米和親条約 1854 United States
Anglo-Japanese Friendship Treaty 日英和親条約 1854 British Empire
Ansei Treaties 安政条約 1858 United States, Kingdom of the Netherlands, Russian Empire, British Empire, French colonial empire
Treaty of Amity and Commerce (Harris Treaty) 日米修好通商条約 1858 United States
Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Amity and Commerce 日英修好通商条約 1858 British Empire
Prussian-Japanese Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation 日普修好通商条約 1861 Kingdom of Prussia
Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation between Austria and Japan 日墺修好通商航海条約 1868 Austro-Hungarian Empire
Spanish-Japanese Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation 日西修好通商航海条約 1868 Kingdom of Spain

 



“The Last Samurai” / Yokohama; İmparator Meiji (VİDEO)

“The Last Samurai” / Yokohama; İmparator Meiji

 




Tarihten Soyutlanmanın Bedeli

 

 

China imperialism cartoon

China imperialism cartoon (W)

"China -- the cake of kings and... of emperors" (a French pun on king cake and kings and emperors wishing to "consume" China). French political cartoon from 1898. A pastry represents "Chine" (French for China) and is being divided between caricatures of Queen Victoria of the United Kingdom, William II of Germany (who is squabbling with Queen Victoria over a borderland piece, whilst thrusting a knife into the pie to signify aggressive German intentions), Nicholas II of Russia, who is eyeing a particular piece, the French Marianne (who is diplomatically shown as not participating in the carving, and is depicted as close to Nicholas II, as a reminder of the Franco-Russian Alliance), and a samurai representing Japan, carefully contemplating which pieces to take. A stereotypical Qing official throws up his hands to try and stop them, but is powerless. It is meant to be a figurative representation of the Imperialist tendencies of these nations towards China during the decade.

 



 

     

Homo sapiensin dünyası üzerinde bir parça toprak kapmak ve sonra kendini yalıtmak ve tarihe kapamak bir dış politika değil, ama başına dert açmak, ve — tam olarak Japonya egemenlerinin gördükleri gibi — zamanı geldiğinde bir sömürge olmayı başından kabullenmektir. Japon bilincinde değişim ve gelişim kavramları henüz bulunmuyordu ve Tokugawa shogunluğu için değişim düşman idi. Bu her despotik kültür için bir kural olarak böyledir. Ama despotizm tarihsel olarak miyoptur. Kendini başka ülkelerden yalıtmayı bir moda yapan Asya ne denli tarihten gizlenmeye çalışırsa çalışsın, Batının onu saklandığı yerden bulup çıkarması kaçınılmazdı. Çin’in başına gelenlerin öğrenilmesi sıranın kendilerine de geleceğini anlayan Japonları dehşete düşürdü ve Meiji Restorasyonu için başlıca güdüyü sağladı. Meiji Restorasyonu Japonya’nın kendine özgü Batılılaşma tarzı, korku ve dehşet yoluyla modernleşme yordamıdır ve militarizmde demir atar. Japon usu özgürce düşünmez, her zaman tutkulara boyun eğer, ve samurai de bu usdışı formülü keşfeden David Hume gibi düşünme özürlüdür. Meiji oligarşisinin insanlık duygusundan yoksun entellektüelleri küt kafaları ile bir tür ‘Dünyanın Fethi’ programının gerekli olduğu çıkarsamasını yaptılar.

 

Öte yandan, Japonlar bütünüyle haksız değildi. Afrika Avrupa’nın kamçıları ve tüfekleri altında köleleştirilirken, Avrupa’nın yalıtılmış Asyatik imparatorluklar ile ilişkileri ilkin eşitsiz anlaşmalar biçiminde oldu. Zor yoluyla yapılan bu anlaşmalar Batılılar için yerel yasalardan bağışıklık ve dinsel özgürlük haklarını kapsıyordu. Zamanla Asya’nın arkaik imparatorlukları ve Avrupa’nın başlangıçta serüvenci gibi görünen ‘Doğu Hindistan Şirketleri’ arasındaki ilişki ekonomik ilişki olmaktan çıktı ve askeri olarak da güçlenen şirketler bir yağma ve sömürü politikasına yöneldiler. Sömürü tecim yoluyla, özgür sözleşmeler yoluyla değil, kolonial yönetimler yoluyla ve en sonunda zor ve şiddet yoluyla yapıldı. Asya ‘dünya pazarı’nın bir parçası olmaktan çok yağmalanacak bir kaynak olarak görülmeye başladı. Ve tüm bu ‘politika’ sözde liberalizm denilen bir ideoloji ile ve yararcılık etiği denilen bir ek ideoloji ile uyum içinde yürütüldü.

 

İngiltere başta olmak üzere, Avrupa ülkeleri teknolojik olarak geri Asya’ya ileri Batı teknolojisini getirirken, etik olarak da geri olan Asya’ya etik getirmediler. Bu henüz onların kendilerinde de olmayan birşeydi. Erken modern evrede (15-18 yy arası), en acımasız biçimleri İngiltere’de olmak üzere, sömürü hiçbir sınır tanımıyor, küçük çocuklar bile en tehlikeli işlerde uzun saatler boyunca çalıştırılıyor, güvenlik, sağlık, temizlik için, genel olarak insan yaşamı için hiçbir kaygı gösterilmiyordu. Ve bu Victorian dönemde İngiltere’nin kendine yönelik insanlık dışı uygulamalarından yalnızca biri idi.

 

Pazar ilişkileri gereksinim nesnelerinin değiş-tokuşundan başka birşey değildir. Salt değiş-tokuş ya da alış-veriş edimi bile özgür tüzel kişiliği varsayar. Her alış-veriş kendinde bir sözleşmedir ve sözleşme istençleri olan, haklarının billincinde olan kişiler arasında yer alır. Erken modern dönemde Avrupalıların Amerika yerlileri, Afrikalılar ve Asyalılar ile ‘tecimsel’ ilişkileri her bir yerel-etnik nüfusun kültürel gelişmişlik düzeyi ile göreli olarak belirlendi. Bir mülkiyet bilincinden yoksun yerlilerden Manhalttan Adasının ‘satın alınması,’ Afrika'da kölelerin silah ve içki karşılığında satın alınması, Çin pazarının silah zoru ile opium tecimine açılması vb. "eşitsiz değiş-tokuş" kavramının da sınırlarını aşar. Avrupalı şirketler bu kıtalarda moral olarak ve etik olarak gelişmemiş kültürler ile karşılaştılar ve kendisi insan hakları bilincinden yoksun Avrupalı için zor, şiddet, ve gerektiğinde terör bu eşitsiz kültürler arasındaki ilişkileri belirleyen başlıca araçlar oldu. Göreli olarak gelişmiş Avrupa ülkeleri ve dünyanın göreli olarak gelişmemiş geri kültür bölgelerii arasındaki ilişki kaçınılmaz olarak sömürgecilik biçimini aldı. "Sömürge İmparatorluğu" deyimi bir oxymorondur ve Batının utancını örtmeye yarar.


Erken Modern Dönem bütün "modern dönemin" ilk ya da başlangıç evresidir ve Reformasyona karşın bu erken dönemde Kuzey Avrupa ülkelerinde Roma Katolik Kilisesinin yarattığı moral bozukluk aşağı yukarı tam gücü ile yürürlüktedir. Modern dönemin başında herşey başlangıçtadır. Özgürlük bilincinin yaygınlaşması ve güçlenmesi yüzyılları gerektirecektir. Henüz evrensel bir politik bilinç yoktur ve Kilisenin denetiminin ve gücünün kalkışı ile yalnızca modern bilincin gelişiminin koşullarından biri şekillenmeye başlamıştır. Henüz türdeş ulus bilinçleri doğuş aşamasındadır ve buna koşut olarak demokrasinin ve ekonominin gelişimi geleceğin sorunlarıdır. Bu aşamada herşey geri, herşey ham, herşey eskinin artıkları ile yüklüdür — özgürlüksüz, duyunçsuz, despotik.

 

Modern dönemin başlangıcında Asya’nın ve Avrupa’nın buluşması bir yandan bir çarpışmadır — uygarlıkların olmaktan çok barbarlıkların. Öte yandan Asya’nın ilk kez dünya tarihine, modernleşme sürecine ve kazanılmasıdır — ve doğallıkla sık sık saklanmalarının moral bir kötülük olacağı kültürlerin yok oluşları pahasına. Bugün de işlemekte olan süreç Hindistan’dan Çin’e, Çin Hindi’ne, Japonya’ya arkaik Asyatik kültürlerin ortadan kalkma ve kendileri olmayan şeyler olma sürecidir.



   

Politik olarak henüz imparatorluklardan oluşan Batının politik bilinçten bütünüyle yoksun Asya etnik kültürleri ile ilişkisi kaçınılmaz olarak sömürgecilik biçimini aldı. Avrupa demokrasileri henüz sahneye çıkmamıştı, ve Rusya’dan İngiltere’ye bütün bir kıtada istençsiz nüfuslar tekerkler altında iken, uluslararası ilişkiler demokratik devletlerin ilişkileri değil imparatorlukların birincil olarak savaş yoluyla, zor ve şiddet yoluyla yürütülen güç ilişkileri idi.


Batılılaşma



Batılılaşma Doğulu bir kültürün hem kendisi kalma hem de başkası olma istenci arasındaki çelişkidir. Doğunun Batıda gördüğü şey birincil olarak güç olduğu için, Batılılaşma ilkin güçlü bir Doğu olma özlemini anlatır. Ve gücü teknolojik ilerleme ile özdeşleştirir.

 

Doğu Batıyı anlayamaz, çünkü Batıda gelişmiş olan kavramlar Doğunun bilincinde bulunmaz. Doğu Batıya kendi kategorileri içinden bakar, onu ancak yetenekli olduğu kavramların prizmasından görür. Doğuda özgürlük bilinci olmadığı için, Batıda gelişmekte olan özgürlük bilinci Doğuyu ilgilendirmez. Doğu Batının "parlamentosuna" bile öykünür, ama Doğuda parlamento yalnızca duvarlardan, kapı ve pencerelerden oluşur ve içi boştur; halkın istenci ile en küçük bir ilgisi yoktur çünkü halkın istenci yoktur.

 

Batılılaşma Doğu kalarak Batılı olma tutkusudur.

 

Doğuda uyarlık barbarlık aşamasında takılıp kaldı. Batıda uygarlık barbarlığı yenmek için Özgürlük İdeası ile donatıldı. Ve evrensel özgürlük bilinci köleliği, demokrasi despotizme saltık olarak üstündür çünkü insan doğası ussaldır.

 

Meiji Japan — Reforming a Nation Through Western Development (VİDEO)

Meiji Japan — Reforming a Nation Through Western Development (LINK)

 





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  • the most "technology-ready" nation
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Singapur

Singapur

Bir güneydoğu Asya kent-devleti olan ve 63 adadan oluşan Singapur'un yüzölçümü 721 km kare, nüfusu 2017 için 5,6 milyondur. Bir parlamenter cumhuriyet olan ülkede başlıca dil İngilizce, ve nüfusun %75'i Çinli, geri kalanın çoğu Malaydır.

   

Singapur İngiliz tecimini bölgedeki Hollanda gücünün yarattığı sıkıntılardan kurtarmak için bir liman olarak 1819'da British East India Company adına Thomas Stamford Raffles tarafından kuruldu. Raffles karaya çıktığı zaman adada 150 Malay ve 30 kadar Çinliden oluşan bir yerleşim bulunuyordu. İngilizler Malay şefleri ile Singapur Antlaşmasını yaparak bir tecim yerleşimi kurma hakkını elde ettiler. Serbest bir liman olarak kurulan koloni hızla gelişti. Koloninin tecim hacmı büyürken nüfus 1821'de 5.000'e ve 1825'te 10.000'e yükseldi. Raffles kumar, opium satışı ve köle tecimini yasakladı. 1824'te kabul edilen Dostluk ve Bağlaşma Antlaşması (Treaty of Friendship and Alliance) ile Singapur'un denetimi aşağı yukarı bütünüyle East India Company'ye bırakıldı. 1858'de Şirketin çökmesi ile adalar British Raj'ın denetimine geçirildi. İkinci Dünya Savaşında Japonlar tarafından işgal edilen Singapur 1963'te kendisini koruyamayan İngiltere'den bağımsızlığını kazandı, Malezya ile birleşti, ama yol açtığı politik karışıklıklardan ötürü Malezya parlamentosu tarafından Malezya'dan çıkarılmasına karar verildiği ve 1965'te egemen bir devlet oldu.

Singapur'un topraktan, doğal kaynaklardan giderek yeteril içme suyundan bile yoksun bir ülke olarak 50 yıl önce pekçok Afrika ülkesinden de geri idi. Bağımsızlığını kazandığı zaman üç milyonluk bu kent-devletinde çoğu işsiz olan nüfusun üçte ikisi varoşlarda yaşıyordu. Kaynakları, altyapısı, eğitimli nüfusu olmayan ve yalnızca gemi boşaltma ve yükleme işlerine yetenekli kaba kas gücü ile Singapur kendi olanak ve yeteneklerine dayanarak hiçbirşey olamaz, elli yıl içinde kişi başına GDP 320 US $’dan kişi başına GDP 60.000 US $’a çıkamazdı.

Yoksulluğu yenebilmek içi Avrupa ve Amerika kapitalini kente çekmekten başka yol olmadığı açıktı ve bunun için gereken tek şey nüfusu hizaya sokmaktı. Olup biteni anlamayan halkı disiplin altına alabilmek için Nazileri ve Sovyetleri imrendirecek bir baskı rejimi kuruldu. İnsan hakları, demokrasi, yasa egemenliği tümü de bir yana atıldı ve yabancı kapitalin gelmesi için olağanüstü uygun bir ortam yaratıldı. Rüşvetsiz, vergisiz, grevsiz, demokrasisiz uysal bir işgücü pazarı hazırlandı. Hiçbir ölçüye sığmayan aşırı ağır cezalar tarafından yıldırılan köleleri çalıştırmak üzere önce Amerikan ve Japon kapitali geldi ve Singapur nüfusu yeni teknolojiler konusunda çokuluslu şirketlerin kendileri kendileri tarafından eğitildi. 1965'ten 1972'ye dek çift basamaklı büyüme hızı ile ülke çok geçmeden eldeki geri insan kaynaklarını ve altyapıyı geliştirme olanağına kavuştu. Singapur'un gelişme formülü bir polis devleti altında ucuz işgücü sunumundan başka birşey değildi. Bugün 2018'de Singapur'da 3.000 çokuluslu şirket iş yapmaktadır.

 

Helen Zille

Helen Zille (W)

Colonialism controversy arising from a trip to Singapore and Japan (W)


In March 2017, after a trip to Singapore and Japan which cost R600 000 for five people, Zille commented on Twitter that the legacy of colonialism was not all bad because it had left a legacy of infrastructure and institutions, which South Africa could build upon. The consequent outrage led to internal disciplinary hearings. Zille is also being investigated for her comments about the legacy of colonialism by the Human Rights Commission for "a potential violation of human dignity".

Criticism and disciplinary hearing

Following accusations that she was defending colonialism, Zille noted that her views had been misconstrued, but also apologised "unreservedly for a tweet that may have come across as a defence of colonialism. It was not."

Among those who disagreed with her were other DA members, such as Mbali Ntuli, who stated that colonialism was “only” negative, and who herself faces a disciplinary hearing in 2017 for "liking" in December 2016 a Facebook comment that characterised Zille as racist;[85] Phumzile van Damme, who stated that there was not “a single aspect of [colonialism] that can be said to be positive or beneficial to Africans”; and party leader Mmusi Maimane, who stated "Colonialism‚ like Apartheid‚ was a system of oppression and subjugation. It can never be justified," but also said in the aftermath that Zille was not a racist and that she had "consistently fought oppression". DA MP Ghaleb Cachalia defended Zille as well-intentioned. He agreed with her that colonialism was not solely negative, and noted that many prominent intellectuals, including Chinua Achebe, Ali Mazrui, Godfrey Mwakikagile and Manmohan Singh, have expressed similar sentiments.

The ANC and Economic Freedom Fighters both demanded that Zille be removed from her position as Western Cape Premier.

As a result of her online comments, Zille was referred to the DA's federal legal commission for a disciplinary hearing on charges of bringing the party into disrepute and damaging the party. Following this news, Zille further defended herself by noting that Nelson Mandela had held the same opinion about colonialism.

 



 





📹 History of Singapore (VİDEO)

History of Singapore (LINK)

Correction at 1:45 the Johor Sultanate was based in the far South of the Malay peninsula and not Sumatra. Thank you for those that pointed this out :) I misread one of the reference maps ;( Contemporary Aceh Sultanate is shown in highlighted area.

 



📹 Why is Singapore so rich? — CNBC Explains (VİDEO)

Why is Singapore so rich? — CNBC Explains (LINK)

Singapore is a tiny country, but it's managed to become an Asian economic hub. CNBC's Xin En Lee explains how the country went from third world to first world.

 





The Rise of Japanese Empire (VİDEO)

The Rise of Japanese Empire (LINK)

 



 

 

   

Bir ülkenin kendini bütün dünyadan yalıtarak sürmesi tarih kavramına aykırıdır, çünkü tarih imparatorlukların istenci tarafından yapıldığı sürece hak imparatorlukların gücünden doğar. İmparatorun istenci saltıktır ve hiçbir sınır tanımaz. Dahası, tıpkı imparatorluklarının hakkının haksız olması gibi, tikel kültürün tikel hakkı da evrensel insan hakları kavramı karşısında haksızdır. Tekil bir ulus için bile tarih hiçbir zaman tekil bir tarih değil ama en sonunda evrensel tarihtir.

 

Tarih homo sapiensin kendinde ne ise kendi için de o olma süreci, gizil olarak ne ise edimsel olarak da o olma sürecidir. Bu nedenle tarih tikel kültürlere takılıp kalamaz ve onları ortadan kaldırır. İstencin işi olarak tarihin ereği istencin kendini tam olarak edimselleştirmesidir. Ereksel edimselleşme gelişimdir ve tarihsel gelişim herhangi bir tikel kültürün değil, evrensel dünya tininin işidir. Aynı zamanda tüzel, moral ve törel ussallaşmadan başka birşey olmayan tarihsel gelişim gelişmeyen ve kendi içlerinde kapanan olumsal-etnik kültürlerin ortaya çıkışı değil, ereksel kültürlerin, insan doğasının idealine doğru büyüyen kültürlerin ortaya çıkışıdır. Birincisi salt reel türlülüğü, kültürel çoğulculuk denilen şeyi üretir. İkincisi ideale doğru türdeşleşmedir. İnsan doğasının etik ideali evrensel özgürlüktür ve evrenselin gelişimi bir gerilikler kalabalığı olan kültürel çoğulculuğun silinmesi yoluyla en son insana dek bireylerin gelişimidir.

 

Dünya tarihinde gelişim tikel insanlık alanları için tikel bir ayrıcalık sorunu olmadığı için, insan haklarının evrensel kazanımı açısından görelilik usdışıdır. Dünya tininin ideali saltık olarak özgürlüktür ve bir haklar türlülüğü, bir etikler türlülüğü, bir duyunçlar türlülüğü, bir göreli özgürlükler türlülüğü usdışıdır. Gerçekte, moral ve etik görelilik tam olarak bu evrensellerin bilinçsizliğinden doğar, ve görelilik kendini pragmatizm ya da tutuculuk olarak gösterdiği zaman, bu bir politika değil ama duyunç hamlığından doğan bir düşünme tembelliğidir.

   

Genel olarak, Dünya Tarihi özgürlük bilincinin doğuşu ile bölümlenir. Asya’da yalnızca tekerk özgür ve egemendir. Yunan-Roma dünyasında nüfusun yalnızca bir bölümü özgürdür. Modern dünya evrensel özgürlük bilinci ile tanımlanır. Evrensel özgürlük bilincinden yoksun ön-modern dünya homo sapiensin tam gelişimine izin vermez, despotik, gelenekçi ve tutucudur.

 

Dünya Tarihinin modern döneminde başlıca problem bilinçli ya da bilinçsiz olarak gelişime kapalı tutucu kültürlerin özgürleşmeleri problemidir. Primitivizm ya da geri kültürleri saklama tutkusu — ya da barbar kültürü ve uygar kültürü eşdeğerde görme eğilimi — insan doğasının tanımayı başaramayacağı usdışı bir görüştür ve kültürel çoğulculuğu savunan postmodern komedyenlere aittir. Kültürel türlülük ancak hoşgörü pahasına olanaklıdır ve kolayca kültürel nefrete ve düşmanlığa bozulur ve kendini kitle kıyımları biçimini de alan insanlık dışı eylemlerde gösterir.

 

Kültürel-Çoğulculuk ve İmparatorluk


 

İmparatorluklar kültürel-çoğulculuğa bayılırlar, çünkü onunla beslenirler. Eğer birbiri ile ölesiye çarpışan kültürlerin bir kalabalığı olmasaydı, imparatorluk da olmazdı. Değişik kültürleri oldukları gibi tutmak ve değişimin yol açacağı yıkımdan kollamak imparatorluğun dinginliği ve sağlamlığı için zorunludur. Onda, tersine, özgür bir ulusun karakteri olan kültürel türdeşlik ölümcül olacaktır. Ulusun doğması monarşinin ölümüdür, çünkü kültürel türdeşlik assimilasyon değil, özgürlük ve eşitlik temelinde ortaya çıkan bir politik birliktir. Ve evrensel insan hakları temelinde ulusların türdeşliği kültürel çoğulculuğun tarihsel olarak kapanışıdır. Çünkü insan hakları, özgürlük, eşitlik, yasa egemenliği — tüm bunlar göreli kültürel-tarihsel yapılar değil, ama insan yapımı olmayan ve hiçbir geçici kültürün üretemeyeceği saltık idealardır.

 

Kültürel-Çoğulculuk ve Hoşgörü


 

Kültürel-çoğulculuk sık sık toplumsal bir sorun olarak ele alınır. Ama aynı zamanda bir uluslar çokluğunun daha geniş düzleminde aynı zamanda politik bir sorun da olduğunu gösterir. Ulusların türdeşleşmesi kültürel çoğulculuk sorununun sonunu gösterir. Bir tür kültürel-çoğulculuk olarak enternasyonalizm etik türdeşlik ile bağdaşmaz ve değişik etik yapıları olan ulusların türlü ve kimi zaman karşıt kültürel yapılarını gözardı etmek zorundadır. Enternasyonalizm hoşgörü politikasının uluslararası düzleme aktarılmasıdır. Kültürel-çoğulculuk ya da kültürel hoşgörü ilkesi kültürlerin birbirini tanımama tutumuna bir çözüm olarak doğar. Kültürel çoğulculuğu salık vermeye götüren etmen bu çoğulculuk öğretisinin kültürel ayrımlar açısından bir hoşgörü politikası olarak görünmesidir. Ama hoşgörünün bir sınırı vardır ve sınırda birşey hem kendisi hem de karşıtıdır. Hoşgörü hoşgörüsüzlüğe geçtiği zaman hoşgörüsüzlüğü üstlenen yanın tutumu karşıtını bütünüyle ortadan kaldırma noktasına dek yeğinleşir.

 

Kültürel-çoğulculuk öğretisi her kültürü eşit değerde görür ve "gelişmiş" ve "gelişmemiş," "ileri" ya da "geri" gibi ayrımları kabul etmez. Moral gelişmişlik ya da gelişmemişlik ayrımını yapmaz ve bu bakış açısından despotizm ve demokrasi politik türlülüğün eşdeğerli kutupları olarak geçerlidir. Bu görelilik bakış açısının olanağı evrensel, gerçek, ideal normların reddedilmesidir.

 

Pragmatizm sonuçlar önemlidir görüşünden yola çıkarak ilkelere düşmanlığı yüreklendirir. Evrensel insan hakları ilkesi, duyunç özgürlüğü ilkesi, yasa egemenliği ilkesi salt ilke oldukları için reddedilir. Legal pozitivizm doğal hak kavramını yadsıyarak yalnızca egemenin buyruğunu yasa olarak görür.

 

Her tür geri bilinç biçimi ileri bilinç biçimlerini zorunlu olarak küçümser, çünkü kendisi küçüktür ve büyük olanı büyümseyecek kategorileri yoktur. Bu nedenle Doğu Batıya her zaman küçümseme ile bakar, onda ona yabancı olanı algılamaz ve ona yalnızca kendi imgesine andırımlı olanı yükler.

Bir devlet egemendir, ve egemenliği başka devletler tarafından egemen olarak, onlara karşı özgür bir kendilik olarak tanınmaktan oluşur. Japonya tanınmasını kendini yalıtarak, kendi içine çekilerek ve kendi dışını reddederek kazanmayı istedi. Bu politika Edo döneminde olduğu gibi o dönemi ortadan kaldıran Meiji İmparatorluk döneminde de Japon politikasının ayırdedici yanı oldu.

 

Japonya ilk kez 17 ve 18’inci yüzyıllarda kendisi evrensel bir etik dönüşüm sürecine girmiş olan Dünya Tarihi ile tanıştı. Tıpkı komşusu İmparatorluk Çininin yüzyıllar boyunca kendini dünyadan yalıtma politikasına sarılmış olması gibi, henüz yasasız ve devletsiz bir feodal kültür olan Japonya da kendini korumanın yolunu değişime karşı her türlü önlemi almada aradı. Bu politika 19’uncu yüzyılın ikinci yarısına dek başarılı oldu. Ama Japonya değişimi reddetmişken, Batı çoktandır kendi feodalizmini ortadan kaldırma ve modernleşme sürecine girmişti. Politik devrimler, bilimsel devrim, işleyim devrimi ile evrensel bir dönüşümü getiren çağ aynı zamanda bir dışa yayılma çağı, bir emperyalizm ve sömürgecilik çağı idi.

 

 

Commodor Perry’nin Japonya’ya ilk gelişi



Yaklaşık iki bin yıllık tarihinin Japonya’yı 19’uncu yüzyılda getirdiği nokta geçmişin hiçbir değişime uğramaksızın olduğu gibi yaşanması idi. Bir pirinç, Shintoizm, Budhizm, samurailer ve geishalar kültürü ile, Japonya’da tarih edimsel olarak askıya alınmıştı. Yaklaşık bin yıl boyunca İmparatorluk salt göstermelik olduğu ve yasa egemenliği gibi birşey bütünüyle yoksun olduğu için, şiddet kültürü tanımlayan birincil karakter idi. Samurainin kılıcı aşağı yukarı kutsal bir nitelik kazandı.

 

   
Çin’de Japonya’da bulunan dörtlü sınıf ayrımına benzer bir toplumsal katmanlaşma yoktur. Çin İmparatorunun egemenliğine herhangi bir ortak bulunmadığı için, tüm nüfus yasa önünde eşit uyruklardan oluşur. Japon nüfusunun %6’sını oluşturan samurailerin geleneği, bütün bir tarihinde Çin seddinin dışında hiçbir yeri işgal etmeyen barışçı, eşitlikçi ve bütünüyle istençsiz Çin kültürü ile karşıtlık içinde, Japon kültürüne daha sonraki militaristik karakterini veren öğedir.

Çin’in hiçbir zaman dışa doğru büyüme gibi bir amacı olmadı ve Çin halkı ve kültürü türdeşliğini bozmadı.

 



İsyancıların teslim olmaları. Japonya'nın hızlı batılılaşmasını protesto eden Satsuma samurailerinin bir ayaklanması hızla bastırıldı ve ayaklanmaya katıldıkları için binlerce isyancı idam edildi.

 

Perry’nin ziyaretlerinden sonra, feodal samurai despotizmi 1860’ların sonunda devrildi ve 1868’de Meiji restorasyonu ile imparatorluk Tokyo’da yeniden gücünü kazandı. “Tüm sorunların” kamu önünde tartışılması, tüm sınıfların ülke yönetimine katılması, herkes için meslek seçme özgürlüğü, geçmişin “kötü” törelerinin terk edilmesi, imparatorluğu güçlendirmek için dünyadan bilgi aranması kabul edildi. Yabancılara karşı önceki düşmanca tutum yerini daha duygudaş bir tutuma bıraktı, ve sono joi (“İmparatoru say, barbarları kov”) formülü wakon yosai (“Japon tini, Batı bilimi”) formülü ile yer değiştirdi.

 

   
*Shogunluk dönemi sırasında soyluların, samurailerin ve tüccar sınıfının çocukları evde ya da özel okullarda eğitildi. Yaygın eğitim sonucunda Tokugawa döneminde okur-yazarlık oranının erkekler için %45 ve kızlar için %15 ve ortalama %30 olduğu hesaplanmaktadır. Bugün Japonya’nın %99 okur-yazarlık oranı dünyada en yüksek orandır. Yine Tokugawa dönemi sırasında Edo (Tokyo) 1 milyon nüfus ile dünyanın en kalabalık kenti olurken, Japonya’nın nüfusu 30 milyona yükseldi.— 3 Ocak 1858’de tahtının gücünü yeniden kazanan İmparator 15 yaşındaki Mutsuhito (1852-1912) idi ve ölümünden sonra Meiji (“aydın egemen”) sanı ile onurlandırıldı. 700 yıllık shogunluk yönetimi sona erince yabancılar geri döndüler ve bir daha ayrılmadılar. Meiji Dönemi (1868-1912) modern ulusun yaratılmasında sonuçlandı.

 



Perry'nin 1854'te feodal hükümete sunduğu en etkileyici armağan dörtte-bir ölçek model tren idi. Tren 1870'lerin başında yeniden yapılarak Tokyo ve Yokohama arasında sefere kondu. Japonlar Perry'yi unuttular. Ama "tren" unutulmadı ve modern Japon teknolojisinin en çarpıcı temsilcilerinden biri oldu..

 

Meiji Anayasası ile ülke Batı ile ilişkilere ve pazar ekonomisine açıldı. Vergi dizgesi modernleştirildi. Batı kurumları ve uygulamaları yalnızca politika, ordu ve endüstri alanlarında değil, ama bütün bir toplum için kabul edildi. Takvim modernleştirildi, telgraf (1869) ve posta hizmetleri (1872) işlemeye başladı, modern gazeteler çoğaldı ve sayıları ülkede okur-yazarlığın yüksekliği nedeniyle 1875’te yüzün üzerine çıktı. Batı giysileri yaygınlaştı ve devlet memurları için zorunlu kılındı. Japonya’nın ilk demiryolu 1872’de açıldı ve yüzyılın sonuna dek 8.000 km kadar demiryolu döşendi.

 

 

   
Goethe’den Darwin’e, Rousseau’ya Batı felsefecileri ve bilimcilerinin kitapları, Batının romanları Japonca’ya çevrildi. Herbert Spencer özel bir saygı gördü ve Meiji hükümeti ülke için en iyi politikanın ne olduğu konusunda kendisine danıştı. Okul ders kitaplarının da çeviriler olması nedeniyle öğrenciler eşitlik ve bireysel haklar gibi düşünceler ile tanışınca, durumu dengelemek için ders kitaplarının içeriğinde Konfiçyus öğretisine ve ulusalcı shinto değerlerine de önem vermenin gerekli olduğu düşünüldü. Ulusal Meclisin kurulması ve bir Anayasa hazırlanması için çalışmalar ve etkinlikler yoğunlaştı ve 1890’da ilk Meclis seçimi yapıldı. 300 yerden 130’unu Liberal Parti ve 41’ini İlerici Reform Partisi aldı. Japonya görünürde demokrasinin yoluna girmişti. Ama bu salt bir yanılsama idi. 1941’de Pearl Harbor bombalandı. Japonya önce Çin’i, sonra Asya’nın geri kalanını, sonra Avusturalya’yı, daha sonra dünyanın bütününü ele geçirme ve “en arı insanlık” olarak insanlığın efendisi olma savaşına girişti.

 

Daha yirminci yüzyıl başlamadan bir anayasal tekerklik olarak yeniden biçimlenen Japonya yasama işlevini yerine getirmek üzere Ulusal Meclisini (Diet) kurdu. Meclis soylulardan oluşan bir üst meclis ve seçilen üyelerden oluşan alt meclis olarak iki bölümden oluşuyordu. Anayasa bireysel hakları devletin çıkarları ile çatışmama koşulu dışında sınırlamıyordu.

 

Büyük ve eğitimli bir iş gücü doğdu. Japonya’nın belli bir kapital birikiminin ve sınırlı da olsa doğal kaynaklarının olmasına karşın, teknolojisi yoktu. Donatım ve uzmanlık alanlarındaki eksikliğin giderilmesi için yabancı donatımın dışalımı yapıldı, çok sayıda Batılı uzmandan yararlanıldı ve yurt dışında eğitilmek üzere öğrenciler gönderildi. Ve ülke açlık, hastalık ve yüksek ölüm oranı ile yaşamayı sürdürdü.

 

 

Japonya İşleyim Devrimini kaçırmış olsa da, arkadan gelenin üstünlüğünden yararlandı, başkalarının yüzyıllar içinde geliştirdiği teknolojiyi elinin altında hazır buldu.

 

   
Geç kalanın üstünlüğü” yalnızca üstünlük değil, ve teknolojik bilginin serbestçe akan ortak bir kazanım olduğu görüşü göründüğü kadar geçerli değildir. Tüm ortada olan teknolojik bilgiye karşın, pekçok ülke o bilgiyi kazanamamakta, giderek varlığından bile habersiz kalmaktadır. Aktarılan teknolojiler çok pahalıya gelebilir ve alıcı ülkenin onları kullanım yeteneği ya da amaca uygunlukları sınırlı olabilir. Japonya durumunda, başka birçok ülkenin tersine, göreli olarak erken bir teknolojik bilgi ve deneyim birikimi vardı ve bu olgu II. Dünya Savaşı sonrası “Japon mucizesi”ni açıklamada dikkatlerden kaçar. Konfiçyus bağlılık etiği, yaşam boyu iş, sendikalar, savunma giderlerinin olmaması gibi etmenler hızlı Japon ekonomik gelişmesini olanaklı kılmak ve açıklamak için yeterli değildir.


Feodal shogunluk yönetimi altında dünyadan kaçan ve kendi içine çekilen Japonya 19’uncu yüzyılda bir tür teknolojik devrim yaptıktan sonra üzerinden ürkekliğini attı ve bu kez karşıt uca geçerek tüm dünyanın egemeni olma planları geliştirmeye başladı. Asya’nın bütünü ve Avustralya da Japonya’yı doyuracak kadar büyük değildi. 1905’te Rusya’yı denizde bozguna uğrattıktan sonra Pearl Harbor saldırısını yaptı. Bütün bir Pasifik Okyanusuna egemen olmak da yeterli değildi. Japon imgelemini Dünyanın bütünün de doyurması olanaksızdı. Japon militarizminin özlemini ve duyduğu açlığın düzeyini anlatmak için ‘imparatorluk’ kavramı uygun değildir.


ABD-Japonya İlişkileri
   

İkinci Dünya Savaşında yenildikten ve teslim olduktan sonra Japonya ekonomik ve politik olarak ABD'nin denetimi altına girdi. ABD yalnızca Japon İmparatoruna dokunamadı ya da dokunmamayı seçti.

 

Except on trade and economic issues, Japan has almost never said "no" to any significant U.S. demand since World War II, especially in the area of international security.

As Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington has put it, Americans are obsessed with Japan because they see it "as a major threat" to American primacy in a crucial arena of power: economics. Many Americans therefore ask a commonsense question: Why should the United States spend money to defend a "free-riding" economic competitor?

The admiration that the Japanese have genuinely felt for the United States, in part because it was unusually generous as an occupying power, is steadily diminishing.

 

U.S. Relations With Japan
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs / Fact Sheet / January 25, 2017

U.S.-Japan Relations

KAYNAK

More information about Japan is available on the Japan Page and from other Department of State publications and other sources listed at the end of this fact sheet.

U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS

Japan is one of the world’s most successful democracies and largest economies. The U.S.-Japan Alliance is the cornerstone of U.S. security interests in Asia and is fundamental to regional stability and prosperity. The Alliance is based on shared vital interests and values, including: the maintenance of stability in the Asia-Pacific region: the preservation and promotion of political and economic freedoms; support for human rights and democratic institutions; and, the expansion of prosperity for the people of both countries and the international community as a whole.

The U.S.-Japan Alliance was strengthened in 2015 through the release of the revised U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines, which provide for new and expanded forms of security-oriented cooperation. Japan provides bases as well as financial and material support to U.S. forward-deployed forces, which are essential for maintaining stability in the region. In January 2016 the United States and Japan signed a new five-year package of host nation support for U.S. forces in Japan. In December 2016, the United States returned a major portion of the Northern Training Area, nearly 10,000 acres, reducing the amount of land utilized by the United States on Okinawa by close to 20 percent

Because of the two countries' combined economic and diplomatic impact on the world, the U.S.-Japan relationship has become global in scope. The United States and Japan cooperate on a broad range of global issues, including development assistance, global health, environmental and resource protection, and women’s empowerment. The countries also collaborate in science and technology in such areas as brain science, aging, infectious disease, personalized medicine, and international space exploration. We are working intensively to expand already strong people-to-people ties in education, science, and other areas.

Japan and the United States collaborate closely on international diplomatic initiatives. The United States consults with Japan and the Republic of Korea on policy regarding North Korea. The United States coordinates with Japan and Australia under the auspices of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue and the Security and Defense Cooperation Forum. In Southeast Asia, U.S.-Japan cooperation advances maritime security and economic development. Outside Asia, Japanese political and financial support has significantly assisted U.S. efforts on a variety of global issues arising, including countering ISIL and terrorism, working to stop the spread of the Ebola and other emerging pandemic infections, advancing environmental goals, maintaining solidarity in the face of Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine, assisting developing countries, countering piracy, and standing up for human rights and democracy. Japan is an indispensable partner in the United Nations and the second-largest contributor to the UN budget. Japan broadly supports the United States on nonproliferation and nuclear issues.

The United States established diplomatic relations with Japan in 1858. During World War II, diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan were severed in the context of the war that followed Japan’s 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. After years of fighting in the Pacific region, Japan signed an instrument of surrender in 1945. Normal diplomatic relations were reestablished in 1952, when the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, which had overseen the postwar Allied occupation of Japan since 1945, disbanded. The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States was signed in 1960.

U.S. Assistance to Japan

The United States provides no development assistance to Japan.

Bilateral Economic Relations

U.S. economic policy toward Japan seeks to expand access to Japan's markets, increase two-way investment, stimulate domestic demand-led economic growth, promote economic restructuring, improve the climate for U.S. investors, and raise the standard of living in both countries. The U.S.-Japan bilateral economic relationship, which is anchored in enormous flows of trade and investment, is strong, mature, and increasingly interdependent.

Japan represents a major market for many U.S. goods and services, including agricultural products, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, films and music, commercial aircraft, nonferrous metals, plastics, medical and scientific supplies, and machinery. U.S. imports from Japan include vehicles, machinery, optic and medical instruments, and organic chemicals. U.S. direct investment in Japan is mostly in the finance/insurance, manufacturing, and wholesale sectors. Japanese direct investment in the United States is mostly in the wholesale trade and manufacturing sectors.

Science and Technology Cooperation

The U.S.-Japan partnership in the areas of science and technology covers a broad array of complex issues facing our two countries and the global community. Under the auspices of the U.S.-Japan Science and Technology Agreement, our two countries have collaborated for over 25 years on scientific research in areas such as new energy technologies, supercomputing, and critical materials. In recognition of these achievements, President Obama and Prime Minister Abe announced in 2014 an extension of our bilateral Science and Technology Agreement for an additional 10 years. The U.S.-Japan Comprehensive Dialogue on Space reflects our deepening cooperation in space. On January 11, 2016, both countries celebrated the 50th anniversary of the U.S.-Japan Cooperative Medical Sciences Program, which has grown over time to encompass attention to health threats affecting other Pacific Rim nations, particularly in Southeast Asia.

Japan's Membership in International Organizations

Japan and the United States belong to a number of the same international organizations, including the United Nations, G7, G-20, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, ASEAN Regional Forum, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization. Japan is also a Partner for Cooperation with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and an observer to the Organization of American States. In January 2016, Japan began its two year role as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Also in 2016 Japan assumed the presidency of the G7 and hosted ten ministerial meetings during the year as well as the May 2016 G7 Leaders’ Summit.

Bilateral Representation

The U.S. Ambassador to Japan is William F. Hagerty IV. Principal embassy officials are listed in the Department's Key Officers List

Japan maintains an embassy in the United States at 2520 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20008 (tel: 202-238-6700).

More information about Japan is available from the Department of State and other sources, some of which are listed here:

Department of State Japan Country Page
Department of State Key Officers List
CIA World Factbook Japan Page
U.S. Embassy
History of U.S. Relations With Japan
Human Rights Reports
International Religious Freedom Reports
Trafficking in Persons Reports
Narcotics Control Reports
Investment Climate Statements
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative Countries Page
U.S. Census Bureau Foreign Trade Statistics
Export.gov International Offices Page
Library of Congress Country Studies
Travel Information

 






Tokyo'daki en ünlü görünüş: Ginza boyunca Tuğla Binalar (Hiroshige III, 1874 (Sharf Collection, Museum of Fine Arts, Boston).


Tokyo'daki Ünlü Yerler: Edobashi'deki Posta Ofisi (Kobayashi Ikuhide, 1889).


Illustration of Singing by the Plum Garden” by Toyohara Chikanobu, 1887.


Illustration of Ladies Sewing” by Adachi Ginkō, 1887.


Meiji imparatoru ve imparatoriçesi genç oğulları ile birlikte. "Japon Soylululuğunun Bir Aynası" (Toyohara Chikanobu, Ağustos 1887).

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Eisenhower)

Office of the Historian

 

İmparator ve Din

KAYNAK
894.001 Hirohito/1–2546: Telegram

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Eisenhower)9

secret
priority
Tokyo, 25 January 1946—1:45 p.m.
[Received January 26.]

CA 57235. Reference WX 93871. Since receipt of WX 85811 investigation has been conducted here under the limitations set forth [Page 396]with reference to possible criminal actions against the Emperor. No specific and tangible evidence has been uncovered with regard to his exact activities which might connect him in varying degree with the political decisions of the Japanese Empire during the last decade. I have gained the definite impression from as complete a research as was possible to me that his connection with affairs of state up to the time of the end of the war was largely ministerial and automatically responsive to the advice of his counsellors. There are those who believe that even had he positive ideas it would have been quite possible that any effort on his part to thwart the current of public opinion controlled and represented by the dominant military clique would have placed him in actual jeopardy.

If he is to be tried great changes must be made in occupational plans and due preparation therefore should be accomplished in preparedness before actual action is initiated. His indictment will unquestionably cause a tremendous convulsion among the Japanese people, the repercussions of which cannot be overestimated. He is a symbol which unites all Japanese. Destroy him and the nation will disintegrate. Practically all Japanese venerate him as the social head of the state and believe rightly or wrongly that the Potsdam Agreements were intended to maintain him as the Emperor of Japan. They will regard allied action [to the contrary as the greatest10] … betrayal in their history and the hatreds and resentments engendered by this thought will unquestionably last for all measurable time. A vendetta for revenge will thereby be initiated whose cycle may well not be complete for centuries if ever.

The whole of Japan can be expected, in my opinion, to resist the action either by passive or semi-active means. They are disarmed and therefore represent no special menace to trained and equipped troops; but is [it] is not inconceivable that all government agencies will break down, the civilized practices will largely cease, and a condition of underground chaos and disorder amounting to guerilla warfare in the mountainous and outlying regions result. I believe all hope of introducing modern democratic methods would disappear and that when military control finally ceased some form of intense regimentation probably along communistic line would arise from the mutilated masses. This would represent an entirely different problem of occupation from those now prevalent. It would be absolutely essential to greatly increase the occupational forces. It is quite possible that a minimum of a million troops would be required which would have to be maintained for an indefinite number of years. In addition a complete civil service might have to be recruited and imported, possibly running into a size of several hundred thousand. An overseas [Page 397]supply service under such conditions would have to be set up on practically a war basis embracing an indigent civil population of many millions. Many other most drastic results which I will not attempt to discuss should be anticipated and complete new plans should be carefully prepared by the Allied powers along all lines to meet the new eventualities. Most careful consideration as to the national forces composing the occupation force is essential. Certainly the US should not be called upon to bear unilaterally the terrific burden of manpower, economics, and other resultant responsibilities.

The decision as to whether the Emperor should be tried as a war criminal involves a policy determination upon such a high level that I would not feel it appropriate for me to make a recommendation; but if the decision by the heads of states is in the affirmative, I recommend the above measures as imperative.

  1. Copy transmitted by the War Department for the information of the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State. In a brief memorandum, January 30, the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) wrote Mr. Acheson that this telegram gave General MacArthur’s views “on trial of Hirohito as a war criminal. They are negative.” Telegram 1059, January 30, 8 p.m., to London, informed the Embassy there and suggested any action “appropriate in order to forestall such development”, namely, publicity on the Emperor as a war-criminal suspect (740.00116 E.W./1–2946).
  2. Words in brackets supplied by Department of Defense.

 

KAYNAK



The Nuremberg Trial and the Tokyo War Crimes Trials (1945-1948)

Office of the Historian

 

The Nuremberg Trial and the Tokyo War Crimes Trials (1945-1948)

Following World War II, the victorious Allied governments established the first international criminal tribunals to prosecute high-level political officials and military authorities for war crimes and other wartime atrocities. The four major Allied powers—France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States—set up the International Military Tribunal (IMT) in Nuremberg, Germany, to prosecute and punish “the major war criminals of the European Axis.” The IMT presided over a combined trial of senior Nazi political and military leaders, as well as several Nazi organizations. The lesser-known International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) was created in Tokyo, Japan, pursuant to a 1946 proclamation by U.S. Army General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in occupied Japan. The IMTFE presided over a series of trials of senior Japanese political and military leaders pursuant to its authority “to try and punish Far Eastern war criminals.”

Needs caption

The origins, composition, and jurisdiction of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals differed in several important respects beyond their geographical differences and personalities. Plans to prosecute German political and military leaders were announced in the 1942 St. James Declaration. In the declaration, the United States joined Australia, Canada, China, India, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, the Soviet Union, and nine exiled governments of German-occupied countries to condemn Germany’s “policy of aggression.” The Declaration stated that these governments “placed among their principal war aims the punishment, through the channel of organized justice, of those guilty of or responsible for these crimes, whether they have ordered them, perpetrated them or participated in them.”

In August 1945, the four major Allied powers therefore signed the 1945 London Agreement, which established the IMT. The following additional countries subsequently “adhered” to the agreement to show their support: Australia, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, India, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia.

The Charter of the International Military Tribunal (or Nuremberg Charter) was annexed to the 1945 London Agreement and outlined the tribunal’s constitution, functions, and jurisdiction. The Nuremberg tribunal consisted of one judge from each of the Allied powers, which each also supplied a prosecution team. The Nuremberg Charter also provided that the IMT had the authority to try and punish persons who “committed any of the following crimes:”

  • (a) Crimes Against Peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a Common Plan or Conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing;
  • (b) War Crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity;
  • (c) Crimes Against Humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of domestic law of the country where perpetrated.

The IMT prosecutors indicted twenty-two senior German political and military leaders, including Hermann Goering, Rudolph Hess, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Alfred Rosenberg, and Albert Speer. Nazi leader Adolf Hitler was not indicted because he had committed suicide in April 1945, in the final days before Germany’s surrender. Seven Nazi organizations also were indicted. The prosecutors sought to have the tribunal declare that these organizations were “criminal organizations” in order to facilitate the later prosecution of their members by other tribunals or courts.

The Nuremberg Trial lasted from November 1945 to October 1946. The tribunal found nineteen individual defendants guilty and sentenced them to punishments that ranged from death by hanging to fifteen years’ imprisonment. Three defendants were found not guilty, one committed suicide prior to trial, and one did not stand trial due to physical or mental illness. The Nuremberg Tribunal also concluded that three of the seven indicted Nazi organizations were “criminal organizations” under the terms of the Charter: the Leadership Corps of the Nazi party; the elite “SS” unit, which carried out the forced transfer, enslavement, and extermination of millions of persons in concentration camps; and the Nazi security police and the Nazi secret police, commonly known as the ‘SD’ and ‘Gestapo,’ respectively, which had instituted slave labor programs and deported Jews, political opponents, and other civilians to concentration camps.

Unlike the IMT, the IMTFE was not created by an international agreement, but it nonetheless emerged from international agreements to try Japanese war criminals. In July 1945, China, the United Kingdom, and the United States signed the Potsdam Declaration, in which they demanded Japan’s “unconditional surrender” and stated that “stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals.” At the time that the Potsdam Declaration was signed, the war in Europe had ended but the war with Japan was continuing. The Soviet Union did not sign the declaration because it did not declare war on Japan until weeks later, on the same day that the United States dropped the second atomic bomb at Nagasaki. Japan surrendered six days later, on August 14, 1945.

At the subsequent Moscow Conference, held in December 1945, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States (with concurrence from China) agreed to a basic structure for the occupation of Japan. General MacArthur, as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, was granted authority to “issue all orders for the implementation of the Terms of Surrender, the occupation and control of Japan, and all directives supplementary thereto.”

In January 1946, acting pursuant to this authority, General MacArthur issued a special proclamation that established the IMTFE. The Charter for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East was annexed to the proclamation. Like the Nuremberg Charter, it laid out the composition, jurisdiction, and functions of the tribunal.

The Charter provided for MacArthur to appoint judges to the IMTFE from the countries that had signed Japan’s instrument of surrender: Australia, Canada, China, France, India, the Netherlands, Philippines, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Each of these countries also had a prosecution team.

As with the IMT, the IMTFE had jurisdiction to try individuals for Crimes Against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity, and the definitions were nearly verbatim to those contained in the Nuremberg Charter. The IMTFE nonetheless had jurisdiction over crimes that occurred over a greater period of time, from the 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria to Japan’s 1945 surrender.

The IMTFE presided over the prosecution of nine senior Japanese political leaders and eighteen military leaders. A Japanese scholar also was indicted, but charges against him were dropped during the trial because he was declared unfit due to mental illness. Japanese Emperor Hirohito and other members of the imperial family were not indicted. In fact, the Allied powers permitted Hirohito to retain his position on the throne, albeit with diminished status.

The Tokyo War Crimes Trials took place from May 1946 to November 1948. The IMTFE found all remaining defendants guilty and sentenced them to punishments ranging from death to seven years’ imprisonment; two defendants died during the trial.

After the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes trials, additional trials were held to try “minor” war criminals. These subsequent trials, however, were not held by international tribunals but instead by domestic courts or by tribunals operated by a single Allied power, such as military commissions. In Germany, for example, each of the Allied powers held trials for alleged war criminals found within their respective zones of occupation. The United States held twelve such trials from 1945 to 1949, each of which combined defendants who were accused of similar acts or had participated in related events. These trials also were held in Nuremberg and thus became known informally as the “subsequent Nuremberg trials.” In Japan, several additional trials were held in cities outside Tokyo.

The Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals contributed significantly to the development of international criminal law, then in its infancy. For several decades, these tribunals stood as the only examples of international war crimes tribunals, but they ultimately served as models for a new series of international criminal tribunals that were established beginning in the 1990s. In addition, the Nuremberg Charter’s reference to “crimes against peace,” “war crimes,” and “crimes against humanity” represented the first time these terms were used and defined in an adopted international instrument. These terms and definitions were adopted nearly verbatim in the Charter of the IMTFE, but have been replicated and expanded in a succession of international legal instruments since that time.

KAYNAK



JAPAN ADRIFT / Foreign Policy Magazine, Tuesday, September 01, 1992; Page: 128 / by Kishore Mahbubani


JAPAN ADRIFT

by Kishore Mahbubani

A Japanese folk tale tells of a young boy who lives in a coastal rice-farming village. One autumn morning, walking alone to work in the fields, he sees to his horror an approaching tsunami, which he knows will destroy the village. Knowing that he has no time to run down the hill to warn the villagers, he sets the rice fields on fire, sure that the desire to save their crops will draw all the villagers up the hill. The precious rice fields are sacrificed, but the villagers are saved from the tsunami. In what follows, some of the precious rice fields of strategic discourse in East Asia might burn, but in the process I hope to alert readers to the wave of changes that approaches the region.

Most believe that Japan emerged from the Cold War a winner. As former senator Paul Tsongas put it during his presidential campaign: “The Cold War is over and the Japanese won.” The burst of the Japanese financial bubble in mid-1992 has somewhat undercut the power of that claim, but no one suggests that the Cold War's end has hurt Japan. Yet in reality Japan leaves the Cold War era more troubled than satisfied, more threatened than secure.

Japanese strategic planners can point to many gains at the end of the Cold War. The Soviet threat has all but disappeated. The chances of a major war either close to or involving Japan seem extremely low. China, which once overshadowed Japan, has since diminished in stature, especially after the June 1989 massacre at Tiananmen Square. The East Asian region, Japan's economic backyard, continues to prosper, boosted now by the economic take-off of

KISHORE MAHBUBANI, a Singapore diplomnat who served as ambassador to the United Nations (1984-89), wrote this article as a fellow at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs. The views expressed are solely his own and were not cleared by the Singapore government. China's coastal provinces. Japan has emerged as the world's second largest economic power, with the prospect of overtaking the first, the United States, in a decade or two. Even in absolute terms, Japan already invests more for the future than the larger United States.

Despite those significant gains, Japan now faces its most difficult, if not precarious, strategic environment since World War II. The Soviet threat that drew Japan comfortably into the Western camp and provided the glue for the U.S.-Japanese security relationship is now gone. Neither the United States nor Japan, each for its own reasons, is yet prepared to abandon the Mutual Security Treaty (MST). But the strategic pillars upon which the MST rested have eroded, leaving the Japanese to wonder whether—and under what circumstances—the United States will be willing to come to Japan's defense in the future.

The notion of a strategically insecure economic superpower is hard to swallow. Consider this: During the Cold War, Japanese security planners did not even consider the possibility of a rupture in the U.S.-Japanese security relationship. Now they do. If that tie breaks, Japan could find itself strategically vulnerable in the face of at least three potentially unfriendly, if not adversarial, neighbors: China, Korea, and Russia. To be sure, no military conflicts are imminent between Japan and any one of them. No war planning is required. But whereas Japan and its neighbors did not worry about each other during the Cold War, now they do. A Beijing Review article in February 1992 warned that "Japan has become more active and independent in conducting its foreign policy in an attempt to fill the vacancy in the Asian-Pacific region left by the withdrawal of U.S. and Russian influences." And South Korean planners say that even after reunification, U.S. forces should stay in Korea to protect Korea from Japan.

The root cause of Japan's problems in the post-Cold War era is the troubled U.S.-Japanese relationship. The key security interests, especially the containment of the Soviet Union, that held the two countries together have diminished or disappeared. It is astonishing how that simple point is either missed or ignored in the analysis of Japanese foreign policy. Consider, for example, how much U.S. and Japanese interests have diverged over Russia. While the United States is trying to rescue Russia, Japan is not convinced that its national interests include helping Russia.

That divergence is significant. In the wake of World War II, and with the coming of the Korean War, America and Japan struck a bargain, albeit an implicit one. The United States forgave all that Japan had done in World War II, and in return Japan became a loyal and dependable ally against the communist bloc. Although the new relationship was not forced upon Japan, it was a manifesdy unequal one. In practical day-to-day terms, it functioned like the "Lone Ranger-Tonto" relationship. Many Japanese may be offended by the comparison, but the evidence is overwhelming. The roots of inequality go back to the very origins of the U.S.-Japanese relationship, when Commodore Matthew Perry demanded that Japan open up to the world. That "demander-demandee" pattern has persisted for more than a century. The Japanese remember well President Franklin Roosevelt's implicit demand that Japan withdraw from China and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's demand that Premier Yoshida Shigeru cease his efforts to normalize ties with China, both of which made President Richard Nixon's shokku decision to normalize ties with China — without consulting Japan — even more galling. Except on trade and economic issues, Japan has almost never said "no" to any significant U.S. demand since World War II, especially in the area of international security. Japan has also served as a vital banker for U.S. foreign policy goals, shaping its official development assistance policies to meet both U.S. and Japanese needs. Their long history of submitting to U.S. demands explains the appeal to the Japanese of Shintaro Ishihara's book The Japan That Can Say No, as well as the emergence of the new term kenbei, meaning dislike of the United States.

In recent times, Japan has only hesitated once in responding to an important U.S. military demand: namely, that it contribute significantly to the Persian Gulf war. That hesitation was rooted in an expectation that Japan's oil supplies would not be affected by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, in a sense of surprise that the West could abandon Saddam Hussein so quickly after building him up as a Western asset, and in the Japanese public's aversion to direct participation in military conflicts. That hesitation cost the Japanese dearly. Their reputation suffered badly in the United States. As a consequence, even the payment of $13 billion, the largest single contribution from any non-Arab coalition member, did not alleviate the feeling that Japan had once again tried to be a free rider on the United States.

The decision of the U.S. government to use the American media to pressure Japan publicly to supply some of the money, if not the men, to help in the Gulf war was a dangerous move on two counts. First, many Americans already feel threatened by Japan's growing economic power. As Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington has put it, Americans are obsessed with Japan because they see it "as a major threat" to American primacy in a crucial arena of power: economics. Many Americans therefore ask a commonsense question: Why should the United States spend money to defend a "free-riding" economic competitor? The media attention, then, further eroded American support for the U.S.-Japanese relationship. It also reinforced the growing Japanese consensus that Americans are making Japan the scapegoat for their own domestic economic troubles. Objective analysis supports the Japanese contention that the root causes of America's economic problems lie in the failure of the U.S. government, in both the executive and legislative btanches, to solve problems of its own creation: budget deficits, heavy internal and external borrowing, and the lack of sufficient long-term investment in either industry or the labor force, to cite just a few obvious points.

The admiration that the Japanese have genuinely felt for the United States, in part because it was unusually generous as an occupying power, is steadily diminishing. Japan is no longer prepared to be the "Tonto." In fact, Japanese increasingly perceive themselves to be superior to the "Lone Ranger." Thus, a structural change — from one-way condescension to mutual condescension — is taking place in the psychological relationship between Japan and America.

To prevent a breakdown in U.S.-Japanese relations, the Japanese establishment has consciously woven a thick web of economic interdependence between the two countries. However, even without a serious U.S.-Japanese rift, Japan could find itself abandoned. Fueled by perceptions of economic rivalry, U.S. relations with Japan could become friendly but merely normal — like, for instance, U.S. relations with Switzerland. The United States may then no longer feel obliged to defend Japan or maintain forces in East Asia to protect Japan's sea lanes. Alternatively, close relations could fall victim to a resurgence of American isolationism: "What we are concerned with is an America turning inward, politically and economically," said Takakazu Kuriyama, the Japanese ambassador to the United States. The Japanese fear that continued American economic troubles—exacerbated by the U.S. government's inability to deal with them—would make Americans unwilling and unable to pay for a continued U.S. military presence overseas.

Difficult Neighbors

Deprived of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, Japan, the only country in the world to have experienced a nuclear attack, will feel threatened by its nuclear-equipped neighbors. What should the Japanese Self-Defense Forces do if China implements its new law on the disputed Senkaku Islands and places troops there? Could a Chinese force be removed as easily as the symbolic Taiwanese presence was a few years ago? With its powerful economy, Japan currently towers over China, Korea, and Russia, but each raises unique security concerns. A hostile alliance of any two of those would be a strategic nightmare for a solitary Japan. With the new sense of uncertainty about the future viability of the U.S.-Japanese defense relationship, Japan has to take a fresh look at its relations with those three neighbors.

Of the three relationships, the Russo-Japanese one appears to be the most troubled at present. The unresolved issue of the Kuril Islands continues to bedevil relations, but the troubled history between Japan and Russia—including the brutal Soviet treatment of Japanese POWs and the USSR's last-minute entry into World War II against Japan in violation of the treaty both had signed—aggravates Japanese distrust of the Russians. Even if the Kuril dispute is resolved, Japan has to ask itself whether long-term Japanese interests would be served by helping Russia become strong again.

Given the economic, social, and political mess that it finds itself in, Russia is not likely to threaten Japan in the near future; but a continuing cool Japanese attitude toward Russia could lead to problems with Japan's Western allies. In May 1992, German chancellor Helmut Kohl publicly criticized Japan for not doing more to help Russia. The triumphant visit of Russian president Boris Yeltsin to Washington in June 1992 indicated that the United States is moving even closer to Russia. How long can Japan, a nominal member of the Western camp, buck that trend?

Traditionally, the Japanese have viewed Korea as a "dagger pointed at the heart of Japan." In the past, they have not hesitated to intervene in or invade Korea, leaving behind a rich residue of Korean distrust of Japan. Remarkably, 47 years after World War II, the Japanese have not even begun to reduce that distrust.

During the Cold War, Japan did not have to worry about Korea. The two large Korean armies threatened each other, not Japan. But if Korea reunifies, the succeeding Korean state, like united Germany, would inherit a formidable military capability, and it would be situated within striking distance of Japan. In 1992, the prospects of an early reunification do not look good—at least not until North Korean leader Kim U Sung dies. But the oudines of the likely solution to the Korean problem are becoming clear. South Korea is likely to emerge as the successor state of the two Koreas, as West Germany did in reunified Germany.

The two powers that have guaranteed North Korean independence now show less interest in the continued division of Korea. Russia, as demonstrated by Mikhail Gorbachev's behavior, now even has a vested interest in a unified Kotea, under South Korea, because that could enable Russia to play the "Korea card" against Japan. China's interests are not so clear-cut.

The present regime in Beijing is probably not keen to see the disappearance of another ideological ally (although visitors to Beijing and Pyongyang can testify that those two cities seem to be in different ideological universes). However, the Chinese are remarkably pragmatic in their foreign policy. The Chinese concept of "flexible power" (man bian) predates Machiavelli by centuries. If China's long-term interests favor a unified Korean peninsula, China will not hesitate to abandon an ideological ally. Japan should therefore assume that a unified Korea—with all the potential dangers that could bring—is in the making, even though the South Koreans, having watched West Germany's difficulties, now favor a slower process of reunification.

Currently, the Japanese are obsessed, and correctly so, with the threat that North Korea will develop nuclear weapons. They would not feel any less alarmed if South Korea inherited a nuclear capability. Given the traditional Japanese-Korean antipathies, several Japanese officials have confidentially said that while Japan can live with a nuclear-armed Russia and China, a nuclear-armed Korea would be unacceptable. Almost certainly Japan would build its own nuclear weapons in response.

The North Korean nuclear issue illustrates the complexity of the Northeast Asian security environment. The campaign against North Korea's nuclear development is publicly led by the United States and Japan. Yet China probably realizes that a North Korean nuclear capability could trigger the nuclearization of Japan. China knows that it cannot stop Japan from going nuclear on its own, and, more crucially, it knows that only the United States can. Hence, even though China in principle opposes the U.S. military presence in the region, there is nothing that China dreads more than an American military withdrawal that could induce Japan to acquire its own nuclear weapons.

Of the three, the most difficult relationship for Japan to work out ultimately in the post-Cold War era will be that with China. Unlike Russia, China cannot be treated purely as an adversary. Yet, with the disappearance of the Soviet threat and the perception that the United States may be turning inward, both China and Japan are beginning to wonder whether they may not be left as the only two giant wresders in the same ring. Both have already begun to circle each other warily, each trying to ascertain the other's intentions.

For China, the emergence of Japan has probably come as an unpleasant surprise. After Japan's surrender in World War II, its adoption of the peace constitution, and its servile dedication to U.S. foreign policy, China did not perceive Japan either as a threat or as an equal. With its nuclear capability, its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, and the assiduous courtship it enjoyed from the United States and other Western countries during the Cold War, China clearly felt itself to be superior to Japan. It blithely ignored Japan's growing economic strength. Neither during Mao's lifetime nor after did China try to work out a long-term modus vivendi with Japan. Instead, its policies toward Japan have been offshoots of China's other concerns, using Japan to escape international isolation in the 1950s and again in the wake of Tiananmen.

Japan does not relish the idea of coming to terms with China on a one-to-one basis. For most of the Cold War, Japan looked up to China. Both Japan's surrender in World War II and the traditional relationship, in which Japan was a cultural and political satellite of China, made it easy for the Japanese to accept an unequal position. Today, however, they no longer revere China, perhaps not even culturally. Japanese leaders and officials have to disguise their disdain for China. They are especially contemptuous of the fact that more than 100 years after the Meiji Restoration of 1868, when Japan began to institute reforms to meet the challenge of a technologically superior Western civilization, China still has not come to terms with the modern world.

In the short run, Japan is primarily concerned that instability in China could bring a mass of refugees to Japan, the beginnings of which the Japanese have already experienced with the arrival of small Chinese fishing vessels. In the long run, it fears that a successful China could once again overshadow Japan. Although at present the prospects for that do not look good, the Japanese recognize with awe the creativity and dynamism of Chinese scientists and entrepreneurs outside China. They see the birth of a new economic synergy linking Hong Kong and Taiwan to China. They realize that a well-organized China could leave Japan trailing, as the Tang Dynasty did.

China holds the key to the solution of many of the region's pressing problems, such as those in Korea, Indochina, and Taiwan. Yet, despite some common interests, Japan will probably find it unwise to raise those issues—except perhaps for Korea—with China. China would reject any discussion on Taiwan, which it considers to be an internal issue. The Chinese leadership would be deeply alarmed if a reduced U.S. presence in Asia brought closer political relations between Japan and Taiwan. So far, however, Japan has behaved with exquisite political correctness on the issue of Taiwan.

The Indochina issue illustrates the difficulty of working out a new Sino-Japanese modus vivendi. The Soviet collapse paved the way for the symbolic recapitulation of Vietnam to China. China felt that it had reasserted its historical influence over the Indochinese peninsula. China, however, is in no position to help Vietnam extricate itself from its economic mess. Japan could help, but China would be deeply troubled by the prospect that Vietnam (or any Southeast Asian state) might be transformed into an economic satellite of Japan.

The potential for Sino-Japanese misunderstanding is great. As long as Beijing remains relatively isolated, it will probably not do anything to provoke Japan. However, that relatively calm state of affairs may not last forever. China could emerge out of the cloud of Tiananmen. Japan s economic influence in the region could become even more pronounced. In hope of "containing" that influence on China's periphery, some Chinese planners have already begun to think of a "small triangle"—composed of the United States, Japan, and China—to replace the "big triangle," which consisted of the United States, the USSR, and China. A new structure of power is thus in the making. Despite the clear evidence that Japan will face new challenges in its relations with the United States and its neighbors, it will be psychologically difficult for the Japanese to admit that they face a problematic new strategic environment. They feel no immediate pain at the end of the Cold War. Instead, Japan appears to have been catapulted to a position of global eminence. The list of attendees at Emperor Hirohito's funeral demonstrates that; few greater gatherings of luminaries have been seen in recent times.

The Forces of Drift

Even if the Japanese were to recognize the new challenges before them, five powerful forces will encourage continued drift.

First, restructuring the U.S.-Japanese relationship will be difficult. There is a great mismatch of needs, attitudes, perceptions, and power relations. Japan needs America for its security; the United States does not need Japan. Since Commodore Perry's time, the United States has been used to making demands on Japan. Japan has never reciprocated. Japanese see theirs as a tiny country overshadowed by a giant America. But the U.S. public also increasingly sees the Japanese as larger than life, providing the only real threat to continued American economic predominance. Racial differences aggravate that sense of threat. The power imbalance can be demonstrated with an analogy. Washington sees the U.S.-Japanese relationship as a friendly game of chess. But where Washington sees it as a one-to-one game, Tokyo sees three other players on the same chessboard: China, Korea, and Russia. Any Japanese move against the United States affects its ties with the other three. In Japanese eyes, there is no "level playing field" in the game.

Superficially, there would appear to be no trouble in the security sphere. The United States has never expressed any doubts about its commitment to the MST, notwithstanding the ongoing question of the cost of keeping U.S. troops in Japan. There is no American public debate on the treaty. "Why risk change?" is the attitude of Japanese policymakers. To restructure the relationship, Japan will have to persuade the United States to continue to protect Japan and at the same time demand that the United States treat Japan as an equal partner. Asking for protection and parity in the same breath is never easy. It will be equally difficult for both sides to admit that while the form of the defense relationship will remain the same (meaning the MST will not be changed), the substance will be different. Instead of protecting Japan from the vanished Soviet threat, the treaty will restrain the nuclearization and militarization of Japan, consequently reassuring Japan's neighbors that it will remain peaceful. In short, the main purpose of the U.S.-Japanese MST will be to contain Japan's growth as a military power. The key problem will be, of course, arriving at such an understanding clearly and publicly, so that the American bodypolitic understands and supports the MST, but without offending the Japanese people.

Second, if the Japanese admit to themselves that they face a new strategic environment with the long-term U.S. defense commitment in doubt, they fear that the only obvious alternative to the MST is an independent Japanese military—and nuclear—capability. Japan is by no means a military midget. Its current defensive military capability is respected. However, without a nuclear umbrella and strong offensive capabilities, Japan cannot contemplate military confrontation with nuclear-equipped neighbors. Some Japanese desire an independent nuclear capability, but they know that would trigger global alarm bells. Many in the West have already developed an inferiority complex with regard to the Japanese and would be deeply troubled to see Japan extend its economic superiority into the military field. The West is not ready to accept the possibility that the preeminent power in all fields could be a non-Western country like Japan, even though Japan is nominally a member of the "Western" group.

Third, if Japan tries to shift course and move closer to its neighbors, it would have to abandon a century-old policy of believing that Japan's destiny lies with the West. Yukichi Fukuzawa, the great Meiji-era reformer, said that Japan should "escape from Asia, and enter into Europe." If it now reverses course and "enters" into Asia, some tensions could also develop with its Western partners. For example, at the end of the Cold War, the promotion of democracy and human ri ghts has been elevated in the Western scheme of priorities. Japan has gone along, by and large, though more out of convenience than conviction. However, as the West applies those new policies pragmatically on strategically important countries (Algeria, for example), and less pragmatically on less vital countries, the difference in geographical interests between Japan and the West will surface. Knowing well that a policy strongly based on the promotion of human rights would only invite several Asian countries to drag out Japan's record up to the end of World War II, Japan is caught between the devil and the deep blue sea in trying to balance its interests as a "Western" and as an Asian country. Hence, one more reason for drifting along.

Fourth, in order to review and reform its relations with its three neighbors, Japan will have to confront ghosts from the past that it has consciously ignored since World War II. To reshape its relations with both China and Korea, Japan must be able to look squarely into their eyes and acknowledge that it was responsible for some of the most painful chapters in their histories. Without such an acknowledgement, it is hard to imagine how new bonds of trust can be forged. Japanese have so far carefully and circumspectly expressed "regret" and "contrition" but, unlike the Germans, they have not yet brought themselves to apologize directly to those peoples.

As long as Emperor Hirohito was living, many Japanese felt constrained in discussing the issue of war crimes because they wanted to avoid embarrassing him. The U.S. decision to ignore the atrocities committed by the Japanese during World War II in order to gain a strong ally in the Korean War aggravated the natural tendency to avoid facing a painful topic. Many Japanese also feel that what Japan did in Korea and China was not different than what other Western colonizers did elsewhere, that the rape of Nanking was no different from the British massacre of Indian protesters at Amritsar. Why, they ask, should Japan atone for its colonial sins when the West never did so? But the Japanese ability to win the trust of their neighbors is linked to their own ability to acknowledge what happened. Many Japanese see a conspiracy to blacken Japan's name in the renewed discussion of World War II. They do not realize that it is an inevitable consequence of Japanese success. If Japan had remained like Bangladesh, few would be interested in discussing its past. With its growing influence, however, it is natural that Japan's neighbors need reassurances that its new-found power will be exercised benignly.

Fifth, in attempting to chart a new course, Japan would also have to face its built-in cultural and political limitations. The Japanese have created a fairly harmonious society, but it is ethnocentric and exclusive. A foreigner has virtually no hope of being accepted as an equal member, no matter how "Japanese" he or she may become in behavior. The inability (or unwillingness) of the Japanese to absorb the several hundred thousand Koreans who have lived in Japan for generations is a powerful statement of the exclusivity of Japanese society. Ethnic exclusivity, as demonstrated by South Africa, does not foster good-neighborliness.

Those cultural obstacles are compounded by Japan's weak, divided, and scandal-ridden political leadership. The frequent changes of prime ministers, the appointment of weak individuals to senior political positions, and the absence of visionary leaders for the new times have all compounded the country's inertia. Japanese behavior at Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Council meetings illustrates the problem. Unlike all the others, the Japanese delegation arrives with two heads, one from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry and one from the Foreign Ministry. While it is not unusual for international delegations to include multiple agencies, it is unusual for one national delegation to speak with two voices. As a result, Japanese policy is often deadlocked, and the signals it sends are often mixed and confusing.

A New Regional Architecture

Despite those five reasons why Japan is likely to drift along, there are equally strong pressures upon Japan to set a bold new course in its foreign policy. The creation of a plethora of new committees, both in the ruling Liberal Democratic party and the Parliament, demonstrate a new effervescence in Japanese thinking.

Japan’s position as an “economic giant” but a “political dwarf” is no longer viable. Japan's economy is already larger than all other East Asian economies combined, and the Japanese gross national product (GNP) makes up 70 per cent of the total for all of Asia, not counting the former Soviet republics. No European country enjoys such a position in its neighborhood. Only the United States comes close, in the size of its GNP compared to the Latin American economies. Yet Japan has relatively little political influence in East Asia—much less than the United States in Latin America. To understand the anomalous position of Japan in East Asia, imagine the United States having less political influence in Latin America than either Brazil or the countries of the Andean Pact. That is Japan's current position in East Asia in relation to China or the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). That situation cannot endure. Japan's problem is that it must create a new political architecture for the region—from scratch. History does not help. The only traditional precolonial political architecture of the region rested on the concept of the "Middle Kingdom," whereby East and Southeast Asia paid tribute to Beijing. Japan cannot recreate such an arrangement. Nor can China, given its current weakness. In forging a new architecture, Japan will find that it must construct at least five pillars.

The first pillar must be a reaffirmation of Japan's nonnuclear status. Japanese leaders may privately consider it unfair that Japan is still not trusted with nuclear weapons, yet they know that Japan's decision to acquire nuclear weapons would destabilize all of its gains since World War II: Japan would find itself isolated not just from its three neighbors but also from the West. That would be nothing short of a strategic nightmare. A strong (rather than grudging) reaffirmation of the nonnuclear option would enhance its neighbors' confidence that Japan's intentions are peaceful. In this light, the continuing rejection of militarism by the Japanese public should also be seen as a strength rather than a weakness because it assuages the fears of Japan's neighbors.

The second pillar of the new architecture must be a restructured U.S.-Japanese relationship. Fundamentally, Japan has to ask itself whether allowing the U.S.-Japanese relationship to drift on its present course will naturally lead to stronger and closer bonds between the two countries or whether the continuation of the present pattern—in which the Japanese public feels constandy bullied by the United States and the American public sees Japan as a "free rider" growing wealthy at America's expense—will bring a progressive deterioration.

So far, Japan has concentrated its efforts on enhancing the economic interdependence between the two countries, acting as a banker for U.S. foreign policy, accepting U.S. vetoes of Japanese foreign policy initiatives, and making it affordable for the Pentagon to station military forces in Japan by paying half the cost. In private, the Japanese often see the United States as a temperamental bull that has to be appeased from time to time. But since the U.S. government has expressed no desire to change the relationship, Japanese planners might wonder, why risk change? Yet the Japanese need to be aware of the profoundly democratic nature of American society. The commitment of the U.S. government to defend Japan is real only if it has the support of the American people. Japan cannot afford to make the same mistake the South Vietnamese generals did in 1975, when they accepted at face value Washington's commitment to defend Saigon without paying attention to American public opinion.

Today, Japan has to convince both the American government and the American people that the U.S.-Japanese security relationship is in the interest of both countries; that Japan is no free rider; and that its commitment to a nonnuclear strategy serves the interests of the United States, the West, and the region. After all, if the United States abandons the MST, U.S. defense planners will have many new concerns. If Japan goes nuclear, the United States will have to plan a defense against a nuclear power that, unlike the USSR, could be technologically more advanced than the United States. Japan could also pose new competition for American arms exporters, an area Japan has not ventured into so far.

The economic tensions between the two countries must also be addressed squarely. The United States has to publicly admit that Japan is being made the scapegoat for America's inability to get its own economic house in order. For its part, Japan needs to make a major pronouncement that a strong United States is in the interest of Japan and the Asian-Pacific region as a whole and that it will work with its neighbors in formulating economic policies to enhance both American competitiveness and American economic interests in the region. Such a bold announcement, followed by concrete actions, may help lay to rest a growing sentiment in the United States that Japan is weakening the U.S. economy.

There is a seeming contradiction between Japan's need for continued American protection and its desire to stand up for itself. But that contradiction arises out of the peculiar nature of the U.S.-Japanese relationship, in which a giant economic power is not allowed to have nuclear weapons. If Japan could become a nuclear power, it could behave like France or the United Kingdom toward the United States; but because that is not an option, the United States should allow Japan to spread its influence in other spheres and not remain a satellite of U.S. foteign policy.

The third pillar of Japan's new architecture must be the development of "good neighbor" policies with China, Korea, and Russia. Recent history in Western Europe has demonstrated that long-held animosities need not endure. While Britain, France, and Germany first joined together under pressure of the common Soviet threat, they are now held together by the immensely intricate networks forged between their societies. Japan can replicate such networks with its neighbors. Trade and investment flows are leading the way; in their wake the Japanese should seek to foster greater crosscultural understanding. Southeast Asia has long been described as the Balkans of Asia. The many races, languages, cultures, and religions approximate the Balkans in their variety; they have helped form a history that is equally complex and sad. Despite those obstacles, though, the ASEAN countries have managed to forge the most successful regional cooperation of the Third World. Tokyo can do no less if it undertakes bold initiatives such as resolving the islands dispute with Russia and apologizing to the Korean and Chinese peoples for the horrors of the past. The Japanese have great psychological difficulties in accepting the need for apology, but they should realize that just as they will never be able to trust the Russians until Moscow apologizes for the brutal treatment of Japanese POWs after World War H, so their neighbors feel the same way about Tokyo.

Japan will have to confront ghosts from the past that it has consciously ignored since World War II.

The fourth pillar must be to build some sense of a common Asian home. Europe was able to escape the legacy of centuries of rivalries and animosities by creating a feeling of a common European home long before Gorbachev uttered that phrase, with a common Greco-Roman heritage serving as a foundation. The ultimate challenge faced by the Japanese is to try to achieve a similar sense in East Asia. Only a common perception that all are riding in the same boat will prevent the region from dissolving into bitter and dangerous conflict. Perhaps the decision of the Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and other East Asian communities in Los Angeles to forget rheit differences and work together after the recent riots could have a demonstrative effect on their parent countries.

Creating such a sense of a common Asian home will be another difficult psychological shift for the Japanese. Ever since the Meiji Restoration, they have equated success with Western acceptance. Clearly, though, to earn the long-term trust of its Asian neighbors—especially giants like China, India, and Indonesia—Japan has to demonstrate that it respects them as fellow Asian countries. It must not treat them with the condescension they sometimes encounter in the West. Japanese aid policies, for example, cannot be simple extensions of Western aid policies, if only because Japan has different geographical interests. In dealing with Asia, Japan has so far bent almost reflexively to American or Western interests, although neither the United States nor Japan will admit to any coercion. For example, when Malaysia suggested an East Asian economic grouping, Japan acquiesced to U.S. opposition before considering whether the region would benefit from such an organization. Similarly, following the Cambodian peace agreement, Japan wanted to lift its investment embargo on Vietnam and end the Asian Development Bank moratorium on loans to Vietnam. But here, too, it gave in to the American position.

The United States does not hesitate in making such demands on Japan, asserting its rights as a protector. Yet wiser counsel should prevail in Washington. America should stop asking Japan to fashion its policies primarily to defend U.S. interests; that will not work in the long run. American opposition to new multilateral links in the Asian-Pacific region clearly illustrates the short-sightedness of American policies. With the explosive growth in trade and investment among the East Asian societies, there is a great need for strengthened multilateral links to lubricate those contacts and provide venues for resolving common problems among the East Asian countries.

Any serious consideration of a common Asian home evokes great disquiet in America and in the West generally, mosdy for fear that another exclusive racial club is being formed. That reflects Western ignorance of the enormous racial and cultural divisions within Asia. The main function of a common Asian home (to include Australia and New Zealand), like the Common European Home, would be to reduce or dissolve racial identities, not to enhance them.

Finally, the fifth pillar requires Japan to become a good global citizen. Japan's efforts to gain a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council reflect that desire. However, its method of trying to gain that seat is a classic case of putting the cart before the horse. Without an established track record of managing international conflicts, what would Japan do on the Security Council? Japan's case for a permanent seat would clearly be enhanced if Tokyo could demonstrate, as the United States has in the Middle East, that it can take the lead in resolving international conflicts.

Consider, for example, the Cambodian peace process. An excellent peace agreement has been signed, but its implementation has been hobbled by a lack of funding, with the United States finding it hard to raise its share of the cost of U.N. peacekeeping operations. Following traditional behavior, the Japanese will wait for the U.S. government to approach them for financial assistance and, after some hesitation, agree to the U.S. request. Instead, the Japanese government should take the initiative and announce that it will meet any financial shortfall in the Cambodian U.N. operations, and take the lead in meeting the economic reconstruction needs of Cambodia. Japan should declare that it will ensure that the long nightmare of the Cambodian people is finally over, thus fulfilling its responsibilities to both the region and common humanity. The entire operation would cost Japan $1 or $2 billion, a fraction of what it paid for the Gulf war, yet the kudos that Japan could earn—in the region, in the West, and especially in the United States—would be enormous. Such a move could drastically alter public perceptions of the Japanese as mere calculating beings with no moral purpose. That is the sort of bold leap that Japan needs to make.

Bold steps, of course, have not been the hallmark of Japanese foreign policy since World War II. Caution has been the key word. But a new trans-Pacific crisis is in the making. Fortunately, both the dangers and the oppottunities are equally clear. The East Asian region is experiencing perhaps the most spectacular economic growth in human history. It began with Japan and spread throughout the region. Yet all East Asian governments realize that their countries' economic growth would still be crippled if Japan were to falter. Japan therefore has considerable influence in fashioning a new political architecture for the region. But to succeed, it will have to meet the interests not only of Japan, but also of its three immediate neighbors, of the East Asian region generally, and of the United States. The future will severely test the diplomatic vision and skill of Japan's leaders.



JAPAN’S QUIET STRENGTH / Foreign Policy Magazine, Thursday, June 01, 1989; Page: 130 / by Saburo Okita


JAPAN’S QUIET STRENGTH

by Saburo Okita

As President George Bush begins to formulate U.S. military and economic policies for the 1990s, he would be wise to give careful consideration to Japan's increasingly important role in the world. It is easy for new U.S. leaders to overlook Japan as they enthusiastically assume power, but they run a grave risk in not appreciating the quiet strength and indirect influence that Japan has acquired worldwide, largely as a result of its tremendous economic success. Bush's decision to attend the funeral of Emperor Hirohito was a reassuring sign that he understands this point.

The facts of Japan's steady growth are well known. Rising from the depths of defeat in 1945, the Japanese economy has achieved a remarkable record of recovery and growth. The first phase of this came in the 1960s, when then Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda implemented a national income-doubling plan that thrust Japan into a decade-long era of double-digit average annual growth. In 1960 Japan's share of world gross national product (GNP) was 3 per cent and America's was 36 per cent. In 1980 Japan's share grew to 9 per cent, and by 1986 it was 12 per cent, slightly more than one-half of the U.S. figure of 23 per cent. In 1987 Japan surpassed the United States in per capita GNP in dollar-denominated terms. Japan also has become increasingly influential in international finance as a result of its high savings rate and the yen's appreciation. Japanese financial institutions held 36 per cent of total international bank assets at the end of June 1988, compared with 14 per cent for American institutions. Japanese actions, like it or not, now have a major impact on world financial markets.

Economic progress has had a major social impact on Japan. The average life expectancy

SABURO OKITA, Japan's minister of foreign affairs from 1979 to 1980, is chairman of the Institute for Domestic and International Policy Studies in Tokyo. rose to 75.6 for men and 81.4 for women in 1987, surpassing the Scandinavian countries and setting new world standards. Likewise, the infant mortality rate (the number of infant deaths per 1,000 births annually) was between 5 and 5.5 in 1987—among the lowest in the world. To give comparative meaning to these numbers, average life expectancy in the United States was 71 for men and 78.3 for women in 1986, and the infant mortality rate was 10.4. The magnitude of the improvement in the health of Japanese is striking when it is considered that in 1935 the average life expectancy was 46.9 for men and 49.6 for women, and the infant mortality rate was 106.7.

The same achievements that have contributed so much to the quality of life in Japan have also generated concern in the international community. Since the Meiji Restoration of 1868 the Japanese people have sought to catch up to the more advanced Western industrialized countries; this focus was intensified in the quest for recovery after defeat in World War II. Yet now that these immediate postwar goals have been largely attained, the Japanese lack a clear consensus about the next step. The Japanese people have yet to find a new and exciting goal for their energies. The Sophia University professor Robert Ballon has characterized the situation by describing the West as a "future-pull" society in which people work to achieve future goals. In contrast, Japan has a "present-push" society where everyone works hard to escape present circumstances but nobody is sure where this leads. This seeming lack of clearly defined goals makes Western observers anxious because they suspect that Japan might revert to its old nationalism. While many options are open to Japan, its future course is not clear. It quietly searches for direction as it preserves its economic strength.

In the search to define Japan's direction in the years ahead, some basic global trends must be mentioned. First, U.S.-Soviet relations seem to be gradually moving from confrontation to negotiation. Second, the two superpowers' dominance—especially their economic dominance—is undergoing a relative decline. Third, issues of economics and technology are growing ever more important in global power relations. Fourth, while U.S. hegemony in the West will weaken relatively, no other country is expected to step in and exercise leadership in America's absence. Fifth, Western Europe is headed toward economic integration. Sixth, little likelihood remains of a major nuclear conflict. And, seventh, Brazil, India, the People's Republic of China, and other leading Third World countries will increasingly have a greater voice in international issues. These global trends are also linked to developments in Asia—among them, China's economic development and the changes in Chinese foreign policy, the rapid advances made by the newly industrializing countries (NICs), the evolving relations between the Soviet Union and Asian-Pacific countries, and the exercise of Japan's financial power through intensive investment in the United States and increasing foreign aid worldwide.

Japan's emergence as a major importer also has important implications. While self-sufficient in rice, Japan relies on external sources for about 90 per cent of its wheat, soybeans, kaoliang (an important feed grain), and corn. In energy the self-sufficiency rate is only 19 per cent, even if nuclear power is included as a domestic source (and this classification is questionable since the fuel still has to be imported). Japan is dependent upon imports for more than 99 per cent of its oil. Import dependencies are also high for iron ore, nonferrous metals, lumber, and other major resources. Grains are imported primarily from Australia, Canada, and the United States; coal from Australia, Canada, and the United States; natural gas from Alaska, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia; and iron ore from Australia and Brazil. In the immediate future, Japan's imports of manufactures from Asia, Europe, and North America are expected to increase. Currently Japan can pay for these imports with relative ease out of its export earnings; but continuous pressure to sell goods and services worldwide to earn the necessary foreign exchange is a reality for this importdependent country. Protecting Japan s Interests

All of these issues set the framework within which the economically strong, militarily weak, and internationally passive population of Japan must operate. Japan's challenge is to protect its interests and not rock what appears to be an evolving international environment favorable to economic gain. A look at key bilateral and regional relationships will help sort out Japan's future policies.

The United States. Japan's relations with the entire world have been shaped by being under America's economic, social, and political wing for more than 40 years. Although there is irritation and frustration in the bilateral relationship, the web of interdependence is so pervasive that it would be virtually impossible to sever relations without crippling both countries. While many observers stress Japan's "uniqueness," Japan and the United States are not as dissimilar as they might seem. For example, both follow a free-market approach led by private-sector vigor. Japan has made efforts to open the market to international competition and to privatize most of the former government monopolies, including railways, telecommunications, and tobacco products. The United States, meanwhile, has grown aware of the need for cooperation between private industry and government, especially in high technology.

Japan does not aspire to replace America as the world's leader; it will be content to stay number two. It will be increasingly important, however, that the United States avoid acting unilaterally and consult more frequently and more substantively with Japan on the management and revitalization of the global economy. Instead of blaming each other for their problems, the two countries need to look for new areas of fruitful cooperation, including the Latin American debt problem and Philippine economic stabilization.

One important cooperative bilateral step was the November 1983 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Japan, which has made it possible for Japan to provide military technology to the United States, though only to it. Still, it will become more difficult to differentiate between sophisticated civilian and military technologies. At the same time, differences between the Japanese and American patent systems have been a nagging source of trouble in high technology and other fields. Both countries clearly need to strive to harmonize their systems to protect intellectual property rights while still enabling society to benefit readily from the advances that are made. It would also be useful for Japanese and American companies to conduct joint research and development ventures so that each could benefit from the other's strengths.

Some foreign criticism of Japan's lack of market openness, its free riding on the global economy, and its lack of defense consciousness is justified; and the Japanese are aware of these problems. They are endeavoring to change their practices at a speed and in ways compatible with Japan's broader national interests. But the Japanese have their own frustrations with the way America operates in the global economy. For example, much of the trade imbalance between America and Japan has been caused by the U.S. fiscal deficit, the overexpansion in domestic consumer demand, and the insistence—particularly during the first half of the 1980s—that an overvalued dollar is indicative of a strong America. It is unreasonable to call upon Japan alone to redress the imbalance. Even Americans recognize that this "credit card mentality" of sustaining the domestic economy by borrowing abroad cannot last forever.

Japan has tried to make adjustments. Japanese macroeconomic policies underwent a major shift in 1986 as the government put renewed priority on expanding domestic demand. The results are clear from the way domestic demand served as the engine of Japan's GNP growth in 1985, 1986, 1987, and 1988. Japan's external trade is also undergoing major structural changes. In 1988, Japanese imports were 25.3 per cent higher than those in 1987, including a 33.3 per cent increase in imports from the United States. Imports of manufactures from nearby Asian countries have also increased sharply. In fact, with the yen's appreciation and the government's efforts to ensure that the market is open, Japanese consumers have become more importminded.

Today, with virtually no restrictions on it, investment into Japan is rising, and foreign corporate investors are reporting strong earnings. In fiscal 1985, 3,370 investments totaled $930 million. By fiscal 1987, 3,946 investments totaled $2.2 billion. Investment from the United States accounted for 684 cases totaling $94C million in fiscal 1987—a 92 per cent increase in value over the previous year. Moreover, this American investment in Japan has been led by electronics, computers, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, and other high-technology areas.

While foreign exporters complain that the Japanese distribution system is a de facto nontariff barrier because of the restrictions on giant retail outlets and the traditional business ties among companies, Japanese consumers today are much more price-conscious; this has resulted in the almost overnight creation of a host of discount outlets. Although the desire to protect mom-and-pop stores has meant some regulations in retailing, these controls are not intended to shut out foreign goods; they make entry just as difficult for new Japanese products as well.

Although Japan's defense spending is widely reported as 1 per cent of GNP, this estimate is calculated according to the Japanese formula. The figure would be closer to 1.6 per cent if the same formula used by the NATO countries was employed. Under this definition, Japan has already passed France, Great Britain, and West Germany in defense spending and now ranks third in the world—exceeded only by the superpowers. While it will probably be necessary to increase Japanese defense spending steadily, a spectacular rise could very well adversely affect the military balance in the Far East. Not many people are calling for Japan to double its defense spending.

Yet the United States says that Japan should do more in the defense-plus-assistance field. Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita announced at the June 1988 economic summit meeting in Toronto a new program under which Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) for the next 5 years will be at least $50 billion—twice the dollar amount as in the preceding 5 years, though a lesser increase in yen terms because of the yen's rapid appreciation against the dollar. In absolute terms, Japan already budgets more for ODA than the United States and is the world's leading donor country. In 1987, Japanese ODA was .31 per cent of GNP, and Japan is expected to reach the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) average of .34 per cent of GNP in another 5 years. Raising the Japanese defense-plus-assistance total to NATO norms would mandate spending 2 per cent of GNP on ODA by 1992. This increase would mean that Japanese ODA disbursements would be larger than the combined ODA disbursements of the other 17 DAC donor countries.

The Japanese people have yet to find a new and exciting goal for their energies.

While it is essential that Japan sharply increase its ODA, there is a limit to what can be done in light of the Japanese government's considerable fiscal deficit. Nevertheless, an ambitious effort is being made. Many Japanese feel that by the year 2000 Japan should raise its ODA to approximately 1 per cent of GNP, a level that prevails in most Scandinavian countries. Put another way, Japan's defenseplus-ODA total as a percentage of GNP would then be about where Canada's is today. This target is both reasonable and realistic. Japan is also looking for other ways to contribute to a better and safer world, including nonmilitary participation in peace-keeping activities, promotion of joint basic research and development, and responses to environmental protection and other global issues.

The Asia-Pacific Region. Including the Nics, China, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—the Asia-Pacific region is the fastest-growing and most dynamic economic region in the world. Economic development in this region is characterized by the "flyinggeese pattern"—that is, consecutive takeoffs with catching-up processes. This trend started with Japan's rapid growth in the 1960s and continued with that of the NICs in the 1970s and of Thailand, Malaysia, and other ASEAN countries, as well as China, of late. Economic relations with the industrialized world are gradually shifting as these countries move from a vertical orientation between the industrialized and the developing economies to horizontal integration in the regional economy. With this shift, multilateral trade and investment have increased within the region, and Japan has become both an important absorber for the products of other Asian countries and an important source of capital and technology for them.

Japan has also sought to cooperate with China's modernization policies. Japan extended an initial package of yen loans to China in the amount of 330 billion yen ($1.5 billion in 1979 dollars) covering the years 1979 through 1983, and a second package in the amount of 540 billion yen ($2.3 billion in 1984 dollars) for 1984 through 1990. In August 1988 Takeshita pledged a package of soft loans and other assistance for 1990 through 1995 totaling 810 billion yen ($6.3 billion in 1988 dollars). Trade between China and Japan is increasing, too. In 1988 total two-way trade was $19.3 billion, 5.6 times what it had been 10 years earlier. And Japan now accounts for fully 20 per cent of Chinese trade. The number of personal visits back and forth is also rising. In 1987, 418,000 Japanese visited China and 73,000 Chinese visited Japan—figures that are 18 times higher than 10 years ago. In comparison, 315,000 Americans visited China in 1987.

One unknown factor in the Chinese puzzle is how the country will act toward its neighbors once its modernization efforts succeed and national strength is bolstered. Given China's population of 1.1 billion, there are limits as to how much the world market can absorb should China adopt the export-oriented strategies used by Hong Kong and Taiwan. It is more likely that China will have to implement a combination of inward- and outward-looking policies. Nevertheless, as China gains a greater voice in international affairs, an unbroken dialogue and determined efforts will be needed to ensure that Sino-Japanese relations remain good.

As for South Korea, its rapid growth will gradually reduce the economic disparity between it and Japan. South Korea is expected to be an increasingly formidable competitor in international markets as it shifts to more advanced industries. The rapid influx of South Korean products into Japan in recent years has sharply reduced its trade deficit with Japan, and it is likely that Korea will move to a surplus in bilateral trade. Two-way trade between Japan and Korea reached $27 billion in 1988, a fortyfold increase over the last two decades that made Korea Japan's second most important trading partner after the United States. While some Japanese companies are suffering because of the heightened competition, others are able to sell more to South Korea, and the result should be an overall expansion in two-way trade. Economic development in South Korea may come to alleviate the historical animosity between the two countries. And with the dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union, the friendly relations between China and Japan, and the expanding trade between South Korea and China, it is hoped that North and South Korea will find more room for dialogue and for governmental, business, cultural, personal, and other exchanges. Japanese security would be helped greatly if the Korean peninsula were no longer a tinderbox.

Although much of Southeast Asia was occupied by Japanese forces during World War II, postwar relations have been reasonably good, starting with reparations and continuing through yen credits, economic and technical assistance, and other contributions to this region's economic development. Nevertheless, feelings toward Japan remain mixed, and an undercurrent of resentment and suspicion remains. While Japanese expansionism did contribute indirectly to freeing these countries from Western colonial rule, it inflicted its own scars on the local communities. Thus the people have both welcomed and feared Japan's economic advances. When then Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka visited the ASEAN countries in January 1974, he encountered virulent anti-Japanese demonstrations virtually wherever he went. Yet with the fall of Saigon in 1975, the subsequent erosion of U.S. influence, and Japan's growing economic importance, many in Southeast Asia have come to take a more realistic view of Japanese influence. A growing recognition that the market-oriented growth model espoused by the United States and Japan is preferable to the centrally planned socialist model of development has also supported this trend. The economic stagnation in Vietnam and Burma and the greater Chinese emphasis on market economies provide ample demonstration of the superiority of market-oriented development.

Japan will be content to stay number two.

As a result, the success achieved by Japan, as well as by South Korea, Taiwan, and the other Asian NICs, has had a profound impact on the formulation of economic policy in Asia. When the Southeast Asian countries complained that the Japanese market was closed to imports, the Japanese import-promotion response, combined with the yen's appreciation, enhanced market access significantly. Since then the complaints have been conspicuously muted. Moreover, because of Japan's balance-of-payments surpluses, it has become a major source of capital to Southeast Asia, contributing to the generally good economic relations with the region. Japan will also continue cooperating with the ASEAN countries, the United States, and other interested parties to see that the tentative steps toward peace in Cambodia evolve into a tangible peace process leading to the restoration of that country's freedom and independence. By providing financial support for peace-keeping efforts, personnel to help supervise free elections, and other nonmilitary aid, including untied economic assistance, Japan can help to promote a successful peace in Cambodia.

The Soviet Union. Japan sees the Soviet Union as an important neighbor in the political and security realms, though not so much in economic relations. In 1988 Japanese-Soviet two-way trade amounted to $5.9 billion, only one-third of Japan's trade with China and just 1.3 per cent of total Japanese trade. The USSR has been more ambitious in its economic approaches to Japan since Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's July 1986 Vladivostok speech on Asian-Pacific policy. In May 1988 Yevgeny Primakov, chairman of the Soviet National Committee for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, attended the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC) meeting in Osaka as a guest member. He stressed the Soviet Union's interest in Pacific economic development and stated that the Soviet Union would be prepared to host a meeting of the study group on energy and mineral resources as part of its cooperation with PECC activities. In diplomacy, it will be difficult for Japan to sign a peace treaty with the USSR so long as Soviet troops continue to occupy the Northern Territories—the islands of Kunashir, Iturup (Etorofu), and Shikotan, as well as the Habomai Islands—a legacy of World War II. Thus it is gratifying that the Soviet Union is taking a more flexible attitude on these issues, as evidenced by the discussion of the territorial problem during former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone's July 1988 meeting with Gorbachev. Japan will be watching closely to see if and how this flexibility is translated into concrete actions aimed at resolving this issue.

Western Europe. Japanese-West European relations are the weak link in the triangle composed of Japan, the United States, and Western Europe. Although Japan took Europe as the model for much of its modernization, the strengthening of U.S.-Japanese relations following World War II has resulted in a weakening of Japanese-West European relations. Japan's trade with the European Community (EC) is about one-half that with the United States. Western Europe places many more restrictions on imports of manufactures from Japan than does the United States. For example, in 1988, France limited Japanese automobiles to 3 per cent of the market, and Italy restricted the total number of vehicles to just 19,890, or .9 per cent of the market. Likewise, imports of videocassette recorders, machine tools, and a host of other products are tightly restricted, and detailed import licenses are required. The situation is further complicated by the variations in restrictions and regulations from country to country within the EC. Whether integration in 1992 will result in an inward-looking "Fortress Europe" or an open and vital market will depend on whether the restrictive countries or the nonrestrictive ones prevail in this regulatory unification process. Although there appears to be a strong tendency toward the formation of a Fortress Europe, it is to be hoped, for Western Europe's sake as well, that the EC will strengthen its economic ties with Japan and the rest of the dynamic Asia-Pacific region.

The Developing World. Japan has made a special effort to position itself as a major actor in the Third World. Japanese development assistance, traditionally concentrated in East and Southeast Asia, has been increasingly directed toward South Asia. Japan is now the leading bilateral development donor for the region. For Bangladesh, Nepal, and a number of other countries, Japanese assistance is grounded in humanitarianism and is intended to contribute to both economic and social development. The rapid economic development in East and Southeast Asia may soon reach South Asia as well. Just as there was a rapid increase in Japanese and then Taiwanese direct investment in Thailand, further developments indicate that this ripple effect is continuing. For example, Thailand and Bangladesh concluded an investment agreement in March 1988, and labor-intensive industry from Singapore is moving to Sri Lanka.

Meanwhile, Indo-Japanese relations remain generally good. The first Japanese yen credits were extended to India, and India has been the second largest recipient of such yen credits on a cumulative basis. Japanese ODA to India in 1986 was $230 million, making Japan the largest donor country at 22 per cent of the total. In 1985 Indo-Japanese two-way trade totaled $2.8 billion. By 1988 it had grown to $3.9 billion and was headed up.

Elsewhere on the subcontinent, Japanese economic assistance to Pakistan has increased sharply since the 1979 Soviet incursion into Afghanistan. In 1987 Japanese ODA to Pakistan was $127 million, a figure exceeded only by the U.S. aid effort to that front-line country. While the leading Japanese imports from India and Pakistan are iron ore, fish and shellfish, raw cotton, and diamonds, the leading exports to the area are machinery and other capital goods. Four of the countries of South Asia still qualify as least developed, and in recent years, Japanese assistance to these countries has been expanding the portion of grant aid.

Japanese attention has been fixed on the Middle East as never before since the oil crisis of 1973. A number of Middle East research institutes now operate in Japan, and an increasing number of Japanese diplomats have become fluent in Arabic. Japan was one of the few countries to maintain diplomatic relations with both Iran and Iraq during their recent war. Through visits by the Japanese foreign minister and other officials, Japan tried to bring the two sides together in peace. Now that hostilities have abated, Japan is gearing up to provide economic assistance for the reconstruction of the war-ravaged economies of Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq. As for the Arab-Israeli conflict, Japan supports United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and therefore has called on Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories. Yet at the same time Japan seeks Arab guarantees of Israel's right to exist. Because Japan will be dependent upon the Persian Gulf region for oil imports for many years to come, it has not sought to align itself firmly with any side in any conflict but rather has tried to encourage peaceful settlements.

Africa, too, has benefited from Japanese concern and interest. At the Venice economic summit in June 1987, then Prime Minister Nakasone announced that the Japanese program to recycle at least $20 billion of Japan's current account surplus would be supplemented by a commitment to provide $500 million in additional grants to Africa over the next 3 years. In the same vein, Takeshita announced at the June 1988 Toronto summit that Japan would in effect waive repayment on $5.5 billion owed it by the poorest, primarily African, countries. Japanese private-sector donations for African famine relief in 1985 was $18.4 million—much more than was thought possible. All indications point to growing Japanese concern for Africa.

Japanese interest in Latin America focuses on the region's economic development potential. However, because about 1 million Japanese live in Brazil, Japanese interest in this country is particularly strong. These Japanese immigrants have contributed greatly to Brazil's economic development. Japan also maintains good relations with Argentina, Mexico, and the other Latin American countries. Although Latin America accounted for only 3.9 per cent of Japan's total two-way trade in 1988, Japan is concerned about the region's debt and economic stagnation. Japanese creditors hold only about 15 per cent of the total debt of the major Latin American debtor countries, but since the United States—the area's largest creditor—may not be able to come up with any dramatic solutions in light of its own indebtedness and budgetary constraints, there is considerable interest in Japan's response. The Harvard University economist Jeffrey Sachs has suggested that because Latin America is a natural market for U.S. exports, putting Japan's surplus savings to use in Latin America would produce a greater gain in U.S. exports than using these savings in Japan would. This effort would be one response to American criticism that Japan is not pulling its own weight in the international community. It is very possible that Japan might assume a more important role in helping to resolve the Latin American debt problem, although the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have to play the pivotal roles. To require the major Latin American debtor countries to continue to devote 5-6 per cent of GNP—about half of their foreign exchange earnings—to debt service could well kill the democracy growing in Latin America. This combination of harsh economic pressures and relatively weak governments further complicates the debt situation and leads to steep inflation. If the debt problem is going to be resolved, the sacrifices must be shared among the debtor countries, the commercial banks, the creditor governments, and international financial institutions. The longer a solution is put off the greater will be the political and economic dislocations.

Achieving Global Influence

Japan is already an economic giant and probably will continue to gain economic strength well into the early 21st century. However, Japan's economic might will not necessarily transform it into the world's number one power. Although Japan's high savings rate, good productivity, outstanding capacity for technology development, and political stability are not expected to change, economic advantage alone is not enough to make a country a leader. In the Summer 1988 issue of Foreign Affairs, former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance postulated that the United States will continue to exercise global leadership well into the future. "The United States will have the world's largest and most innovative economy, and will remain a nuclear superpower, a cultural and intellectual leader, a model democracy and a society that provides exceptionally well for the needs of its citizens," they wrote. Strong though Japan may be economically and technologically, it lacks the military might and the mature cultural and intellectual leadership needed to exercise global power. The sharp difference in the openness of the two societies—the United States being a country of immigrants and Japan an island country with a long history of isolation—as well as the language barrier, also makes it difficult for Japan to assume global leadership. English is the international language; Japanese remains a minor tongue. These disparities are demonstrated vividly by the number of foreign students studying in the two countries—the United States had 344,000 in 1986 and Japan only 22,000 a year later.

Accepting that Japanese military spending will increase only gradually and that the Japanese savings rate will continue to be high, how can Japan best use the massive surplus capital that will be available for some years to come? One possibility is to expand investment in its public works, housing, and other private-sector capital projects while expanding personal consumption so that the savings rate declines. There is also considerable potential overseas for recycling these funds in the form of direct investment, international finance, and ODA. In April 1986 the Helsinki-based World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) issued a report entitled The Potential of the Japanese Surplus for World Economic Development. This study was followed up in May 1987 with Mobilizing International Surpluses for World Development: A WIDER Plan for a Japanese Initiative, which called on Japan to recycle a total of $25 billion per year to developing countries over the next 5 years. Significantly, at the Venice summit Nakasone pledged to supply the developing countries with not less than $20 billion in completely untied funds over the next 3 years. Added to the $10 billion in untied funds pledged the previous year to the IMF, the World Bank, the International Development Association, the Asian Development Bank, and other international financial institutions, the total commitment came to more than $30 billion in 3 years. More than 80 per cent of this total was already committed by the end of 1988. Takeshita also pledged at the Toronto summit that Japanese ODA would be raised to at least $50 billion over the 5-year period from 1988 through 1992. At the same time, privatesector direct overseas investment has increased strongly—to $33.4 billion in fiscal 1987, with one-third going to the developing countries. Adding together recycling, ODA, and private direct investment and discounting for the overlap in recycling and ODA accounting, the total comes to approximately the $25 billion per year called for in the second WIDER report.

Along with providing funds for developing countries, Japan should also be able to continue supplying capital to the United States and other industrialized countries. A continuing supply of capital from Japan is especially important for the United States because it offsets the massive balance-of-payments deficits, which may not go away anytime soon. Inflows of Japanese capital enable the United States to avert inflation, maintain employment, and continue its strong industrial investment. However, much of Japan's balanceof-payments surplus is the other side of an American deficit; so if the United States is able to resolve its twin deficits and achieve equilibrium in its balance of payments, a corresponding diminution of Japan's balanceof-payments surplus will probably result.

In the long run, it is detrimental to international economic development for the United States to continue running massive balance-ofpayments deficits and to suck up capital from around the globe. Unless the United States once more becomes a major capital exporter, the developing countries will compete with it in world capital markets and will find themselves unable to secure needed funds at a lower cost. The net flow of capital worldwide showed a $40 billion flow to the developing countries in 1980. Yet since 1985 there has been a net flow from the developing countries of approximately $30 billion per year. This outflow greatly impedes economic growth in the developing countries.

Some observers persist in demanding that Japan do more militarily. Japan's military role is limited by its postwar constitution. But even if the rest of the world were willing to tolerate a greater military role for Japan, a clear majority of the Japanese people support the determination to have their country contribute to a better world in nonmilitary ways—by employing its economic and technological capabilities to solve global environmental problems, improve health care, advance science, educate foreign students, and foster growth in less developed regions. Moreover, there is considerable anxiety in neighboring Asian countries about increased Japanese defense spending. While some Japanese would prefer a different path—arguing that the victors had no right to judge the vanquished, that the postwar constitution is invalid because it was imposed by U.S. occupation forces, and that Japan should therefore draw up a new constitution with different founding principles—the constitution has won broad and strong support among the people, and most would be opposed to any revision. It is unlikely that self-centered and narrowly nationalistic forces will gain strength in the foreseeable future.

Still, some overseas Japanologists and others predict that Japan eventually will use its economic might to expand its military force and stake out an independent role in the international community. For them any economic power must inevitably become a military power. However, military power may very well become a less important component of international influence in the 21st century, and the current revulsion toward and rejection of nuclear weapons may grow. Japan's postwar decision to be an exclusively defensive power and to base its security on nonnuclear principles may well be a forerunner of global trends. As such, Japanese public opinion most likely will continue to favor building a Japan whose contribution to a better world is made peacefully and largely through economic strengths. The international climate probably will be increasingly conducive to such a role.

The Western world is beset with the range of problems said to characterize mature, postindustrial societies. Although Japan is a non-Western society, it has been recognized globally not only for its successful industrialization efforts, but also for its managerial know-how, technological prowess, artistic designs, and many other accomplishments. If Japan can succeed in creating a harmonious postindustrial society, it could provide a very promising model for other countries, industrialized and developing alike. There is no need for Japan to become a military superpower to do this. Since their defeat in World War II, the Japanese people have concentrated on rebuilding their economy and making their industry a world-class competitor. Now the Japanese are growing aware that their country cannot continue to enjoy this good life unless the rest of the global economy prospers as well.

 



THE RISEN SUN: JAPANESE GAULLISM? / Foreign Policy Magazine, Monday, December 01, 1980; Page: 63 / by Isaac Shapiro


THE RISEN SUN: JAPANESE GAULLISM?

ISAAC SHAPIRO, a partner in the taw firm Milbank, Tweed, Hadley, & McCloy, was raised in Japan and is a former president of the Japan Society of New York, 1970-1977.

It is time for U.S. policy makers to reexamine the basic assumption that has guided them in dealing with Japan during the past three decades. They have assumed that a fundamental partnership exists between Japan and the United States based on shared values, economic interdependence, and security considerations and that while frictions may develop from time to time, the partnership will remain intact.

But it may be that this 35-year-old alliance between Japan and the United States has been based on nothing deeper than pragmatic considerations of economics and security. If so, the 1980s and 1990s should see the progressive emergence of a more independent Japan and, consequently, a more independent Japanese foreign policy that occasionally will lead Japan to take positions on significant issues that are not consistent with those of the United States. While rapid changes in Japan's foreign policy are not necessarily to be expected, it is important for policy makers in the United States to understand that Japan is on the threshold of a new era in its understanding of itself and its relations with the rest of the world.

For more than a century, Japan has been trying to reconcile its Asian identity with its desire for status and the security provided by a commitment to the Western international order. In the 1930s and 1940s, Japan unsuccessfully sought to establish—by military means—a new order in East Asia based on the creation of a regional economic, political, and cultural bloc, with Japan as the dominant and stabilizing force. After its surrender in 1945, Japan abandoned this vision of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. However, while it tried not to sacrifice the security and status afforded by close ties to the West, particularly to the United States, it did not abandon its effort to define the Japanese nation in terms that would permit it to retain its own identity as an Asian nation.

In November 1979 a public opinion poll taken by the prime minister's office showed that most Japanese still think the United States is the country most important to Japan. Most of those polled, however, did not think that Japan interacts with the United States as an equal and favored placing the relationship on a more balanced footing. Recently, there has been a slow but perceptible shift away from dependence on the United States as Japan has sought to build closer economic and political ties to Western Europe, to its Asian trading partners, and to the countries that supply it with oil and other raw materials.

With the ending of Japan's postwar dependence on the United States has come the close of the age that has been called the moratorium society in Japan. Keigo Okonogi, who has drawn attention to this phrase in his book Moratoriamu ningen no jidai (The Age of the Moratorium Man), contends that since World War II Japan has been in a state of moratorium in which normal duties and obligations have been suspended. But, says Okonogi, the moratorium has expired as internal and external pressures push Japan into playing a new, more dominant role in the international community and as its dependence on the United States declines. The late Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira was probably expressing the view of a majority of the Japanese people when he said at a campaign rally on April 27, 1980, that the United States is ". . . not a superpower any more. The days are gone when we were able to rely on America's deterrent."

Like Seeds in the Wind

Some Japanese commentators have gone quite far in their call for the emergence of a new Japan. In an article published in Shokun in October 1979, Professor Tetsuya Kataoka of Saitama University not only calls for Japan to be ready to defend itself, but also argues that it is time for a sweeping revision of the Japanese constitution and the creation of a new regime to supersede the present Japanese state. He likens this new regime to former French President Charles de Gaulle's Fifth Republic, describing "Gaullist Japan" as a country that would cease to depend wholly on the United States for military protection. In Kataoka's mind, this would include acquisition of a nuclear force and reform of Japanese political institutions along French and American lines.

The desire for a gradual movement away from the West toward greater self-reliance is expressed not only in political and military terms, but also in psychological terms. This attitude was reflected in two articles that appeared in the Japan Times. Addressing their remarks directly to Western readers, the authors made pointed distinctions between Western and Eastern values. In the first of the articles, on March 28, 1980, Kiyoaki Murata, editor in chief of the Japan Times, wrote:

That the West seems to have made efforts to make itself better known to Japan was partly due to its Judeo-Christian background with its egocentric assumption that its own values are absolutely right and that others should accept them. On the other hand, neither Shinto nor Buddhism shares the West's eagerness to impose its values on others, the sole exception being the Nichirenite sects of Buddhism.

On April 20, 1980, Professor Kenichi Kohyama of Gakushuin University continued the attack by asserting that the West was hypocritical in protesting the slaying of dolphins by Japanese fishermen. In an article entitled "Dolphinism—Ragtag Remnant of 'Imperial Isms' " and subtitled "Self-Righteous Westerners Should Analyze Own Violent History Before Imposing Values," Kohyama wrote:

For the past few centuries, like dandelion seeds spread by the wind, the seed that has spread to the corners of the world has been that of Judeo-Christian culture and its Western social ecosystem. . . . The Western social ecosystem model was idealized and enshrined as absolute, and non-Western social ecosystems were regarded as obsolete and barbaric. Even the elite in non-Western societies who had undergone Western education were baptized with this Western prejudice and came to possess 'planks in their eyes' and became unable to recognize prejudice as prejudice.

These attempts by the Japanese to redefine their identity in Asian rather than Western or universal terms seem to portend a revival of Japanese nationalism that is comparable to the neonationalist movement in France during the 1960s. They would also appear to provide the psychological, social, and political underpinnings for the emergence of an independent foreign policy, just as they did in the case of France. Of course, Gaullism in the Japanese context should not be understood as taking the form of a dramatic declaration of disengagement from the U.S.-Japanese military alliance or from the West in general. Nor should it be viewed as a nostalgic desire to return to the prewar era of militaristic imperialism, fed by a mythoriented nationalism. Rather, it represents a desire on the part of the Japanese, who have a keen sense of their own cultural and historic uniqueness, to create their own vision of what Japan is and where it fits into a world no longer dominated by any one nation or group of nations or by any single religious or political ideology.

Rising Tide of Neonationalism

The reasons for the apparent dawning of a new era in Japan's relations with the United States are many. First, there is the passage of time. Thirty-five years have elapsed since Japan's surrender in 1945. More than half the Japanese population was born after that time. The generation of business and government leaders born in the Meiji Era (1868-1912), who witnessed Japan's defeat by the United States and who led Japan through its postwar reconstruction under U.S. tutelage, is gradually (though reluctantly) fading out of any central policymaking role. It is true that the new prime minister, Zenko Suzuki, is 69 years old, and the average age of the members of Japan's new cabinet is 63 years old. But this represents only a temporary setback for the middle-ranking politicians in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) who campaigned unsuccessfully for a change of generation in leadership following the death of Ohira in June 1980.

Fresh moves for a generational change are bound to come, and the younger leaders will emerge from those who are now in their fifties and who were born during the Taisho Era (1912-1926) or the Showa Era (1926-present). Although many of them have traveled or studied abroad, according to opinion polls they harbor a nationalistic skepticism toward Western values. They are now impatiently pressing to take over the reins of leadership from the postwar leaders in Japan, who have long been viewed as too subservient to U.S. interests.

Second, U.S. military and economic strength and influence around the world are perceived to have declined steadily since 1945. Since 1971 in particular, the dollar's fall from grace and the U.S. failure in Vietnam have made the United States obsolete as a role model for Japan.

The use of the external model has been characteristic of Japan since the Meiji Restoration of 1868, when political power was assumed by leaders who were determined to modernize Japan by imitating Western techniques and institutions. The Second German Empire served as Japan's Western role model from 1870 until Germany's defeat in World War I. For more than a decade after the war, Japan identified itself with the victorious Western powers, adopting Great Britain as its external role model and flirting with a British style of parliamentary democracy.

The decade of the 1930s saw a sharp reversal in Japan's attitude toward the West, as Japan's military leaders successfully sought to have Japan overcome what they viewed as unfair Western domination of the world order and undermining of Japan's interest in Asia. From 1931 to 1945, Japan not only rejected the Western concept of Japan's place in the world and in Asia, but also spurned the West as a role model for Japan, turning instead inward to its own mythos for the basis of a new moral order in Asia with Japan as its leader.

After Japan's defeat in 1945, the United States, as the principal victor and pre-eminent world military and economic power, took over the role of political, economic, and moral tutor. This period of tutelage may have ended long before the beginning of the decline of the United States as the dominant world power. In the absence of any foreign country that readily presents itself as a new paragon, Japan has turned inward once again.

Third, Japan is enjoying phenomenal economic success and is envied around the world for its ability to manage its economy and govern itself within the framework of a working political democracy. This, along with the resulting prosperity and middleclass consciousness of the Japanese people, tends to make the Japanese feel that they have now achieved parity with the West and can draw on their own values and resources.

Fourth, the world economic situation has changed dramatically since 1945. The Western powers no longer control access to raw materials necessary to fuel the Japanese economic machine. For example, Japan, which must rely on imports for its supply of oil, used to depend on the British, Dutch, and U.S. international oil companies. Today much of Japan's imported oil is purchased directly from oil-producing countries. As a result, Japan's political and economic relations with those countries have assumed much greater importance. At the same time, the quadrupling of oil prices following the Middle East war in October 1973 stimulated Japan to reduce its dependence on oil, which is expected to decline from the current 75 per cent of total energy supplies to about 65 per cent in 1985.

Oil is not the only imported raw material on which Japan heavily depends. While Japan imports more than 99 per cent of its crude oil and 70 per cent of its natural gas requirements, it also imports more than 99 per cent of its requirements of iron ore and almost 80 per cent of its coal requirements. The percentage of its requirement of other extracted raw materials that must be imported is more than 99 per cent for copper ore, 68 per cent for lead, 61 per cent for zinc, 100 per cent for bauxite, and 100 per cent for nickel. For these products Japan is dependent primarily, and in some cases exclusively, on countries other than the United States and its Western allies. Only in the case of agricultural commodities does Japan continue to depend heavily on imports from the United States.

Additionally, in the last decade trade with the United States as a proportion of Japan's total trade has dropped significantly. Japan's exports to the United States in 1968 accounted for 31.5 per cent of its total exports. By 1978 this figure had declined to 25.5 per cent. In the period from 1968 to 1979, the U.S. share of Japan's manufactured imports dropped from 38 per cent to 23 per cent, and its share of Japan's raw material and energy imports declined from 23.2 per cent in 1968 to 16.3 per cent in 1978. The same period has seen a corresponding rise in the proportion of Japan's external trade with Australia, China, South Korea, and Southeast Asia and a directly related, growing interest in expanding political and cultural ties to these countries.

Fifth, the United States has encouraged and sometimes directly pressured Japan to become more independent. Since 1971 the development of a growing trade imbalance between the United States and Japan in Japan's favor has resulted in trade frictions.

Representatives of the United States have repeatedly urged the Japanese to take on a more responsible role in the international arena and to assume a greater burden in providing for their own defense. Over the past year, it has become evident that Japan is paying greater heed to this call by striking out on its own more frequently in the international arena and by taking steps to strengthen its military capability.

Sixth, Japanese commentators generally agree that Japan today is witnessing a rising tide of neonationalism. During the three decades after Japan's defeat in World War II, nationalist aspirations and attitudes tended to be repressed in the face of a strong wave of postwar internationalism that followed the establishment of the United Nations. But public opinion polls taken in Japan during the past three years reflect a growing interest, particularly on the part of Japanese youth, in Japanese history, language, and traditions.

During 1980 Japanese business leaders have begun to speak out on the defense issue in a forceful way for the first time.

In addition, a number of cautious but well-publicized moves by the Japanese government indicate a general revival of the national pride and tradition that have lain dormant for so long. For example, in 1977 the Supreme Court of Japan ruled, in a ten to five decision, that the holding of Shinto rites in connection with the ground-breaking ceremony for a municipal building did not violate the Japanese constitution's provisions requiring state neutrality on religious matters. One of the grounds for the ruling was that the holding of such rites was an established national custom that did not constitute the promotion of Shinto as a state religion. The dissenting opinion was written by then Chief Justice Ekizo Fujibayashi, a practicing Christian, and public criticism of the decision was sparked primarily by left-wing opposition parties and Christian organizations.

In June 1979, after more than a year of wide public debate and in the face of strong objections from the opposition parties, the Ohira government obtained Diet passage of a law officially re-establishing the Gengo system of using imperial era names to denote the years of each successive emperor's reign (e.g., Meiji Era, Taisho Era, Showa Era). While this was not considered a matter of great substantive importance, the intensity of the debate made it obvious that this was a matter to which the government attached great symbolic significance.

In another symbolic example of a nationalist revival, Ohira, although a nominal Christian, not only paid a customary visit to the Grand Shrine at Ise following his investiture in 1979, but on April 21, 1980, also visited the Yasukuni Shrine for the war dead. Suzuki did likewise, choosing August 15, the anniversary of Japan's World War II surrender, as the day to do so. A few days earlier, on August 5, the LDP decided to appoint a special committee to study matters related to the Yasukuni Shrine, including the question of whether it should once again be state supported, as pledged during the June election campaign. This would permit official—as distinguished from privatevisits to the Yasukuni Shrine by the emperor and the prime minister.

Although the emperor of Japan, during his 1975 visit to the United States, made a formal apology on behalf of Japan for launching the attack on Pearl Harbor, there is little evidence that the Japanese people as a whole have suffered the kind of guilt that has characterized the feelings of the German postwar generation. On the contrary, Japanese military songs, including those from World War II, are enjoying a revival, and Japanese literature is devoid of any expressions of guilt. In March 1980 it was announced that, in spite of the objections of left-wing and Christian groups, a monument is to be built by the local government in honor of General Hideki Tojo, Japan's wartime prime minister, at the site of his execution by the Allied powers. The difference in attitudes in postwar Germany and Japan may be explained in part by differing attitudes toward the concept of guilt and sin in Judeo-Christian culture and Japanese religious thought and tradition. Another part of the explanation may lie in the victim mentality of the Japanese, aggravated by the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The Nuclear Plunge

Perhaps the key development in the evolution of Japanese foreign policy is the gradual emergence of a new defense policy and a new climate for debate concerning the direction that defense policy should take. The defense debate has inevitably brought into question the future of the U.S.-Japanese security treaties of 1952 and 1960 as well as the controversial war-renouncing article nine of the postwar constitution. The next two or three years promise to witness a fullscale public debate on these two issues.

It is generally recognized in Japan that the U.S.-Japanese security treaty has important limitations. Not only is there no provision for reciprocity of obligations, but there is also apprehension in Japan about the extent and nature of the U.S. obligation to defend Japan in case of an attack. Repeated U.S. requests that Japan increase its spending significantly and that it speed the achievement of the goals set forth in the Defense Agency's current Five-Year Plan have only added to the concern of the Japanese about the security provided by the treaty. The impotence exhibited by the United States in its confrontation with Iran and the U.S. inability either to deter the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan or to force the withdrawal of Soviet troops from that country have served only to reinforce the view of those who believe that Japanese rearmament has become a political necessity.

During 1980 Japanese business leaders have begun to speak out on the defense issue in a forceful way for the first time. In February Hosai Hyuga, chairman of Sumitomo Metals and president of the Kankeiren (the federation of business organizations in the Kansai region), proposed that the Japanese government prepare a study on revival of the military draft in case of emergency and that defense expenditures be raised to 1.9 per cent of the gross national product (GNP). But Hyuga is 74 years old.

It is more significant for the future that in April 1980 the Kinki chapter of the Japan Junior Chamber of Commerce, in a paper entitled "Japan's Security and Defense," called for the institution of a reservist registration system. The chapter also announced that it planned to start a public debate on revision of the constitution, institution of a draft system, and future Japanese possession of nuclear arms. Finally, this summer a new committee of the Keidanren (federation of business organizations) was charged with the task of reviewing Japan's defense policy and making recommendations concerning its future direction.

Japanese politicians have not been unmindful of the growing public interest in defense issues. For the first time since World War II, a special committee on defense was established in April 1980 in the lower house of the Diet. A parallel committee is expected to be established in the upper house. While the new committees have been officially proclaimed to be for study and research purposes, their establishment represents a significant step on the part of the Japanese government, because defense questions previously had been treated exclusively by the respective budget committees. Not surprisingly, the first task of these committees is to discuss the credibility of the U.S.-Japanese security treaty.

The leaders of the LDP have interpreted the substantial increase in the party's parliamentary majority following the June 1980 election as a mandate for a military build-up and have already taken concrete steps to strengthen Japan's nonnuclear military capability. In late July three defense-related committees of the LDP concluded that in reinforcing its defense capability Japan should not be bound by the cabinet's decision of November 1976 to limit the defense budget to 1 per cent of the GNP. Shortly thereafter, in response to repeated pressure from the United States, the Suzuki cabinet approved a plan to increase the national defense budget for the fiscal year beginning in April 1981. The plan calls for an exceptional 9.7 per cent increase, bringing the defense budget to 0.91 per cent of Japan's estimated GNP for the year, while holding down 1981 budget increases in all other areas to 7.9 per cent. Suzuki also called for the creation of a new, interministerial national security council to supplant the existing National Defense Council.

Japanese government leaders have been quick to deny that this presages the acquisition of a nuclear deterrent by Japan. A majority of the Japanese people continue to oppose Japan's possession of nuclear weapons, even though a growing minorityalmost 40 per cent—believes that Japan will have a nuclear arsenal within the next decade. Although it is hard to imagine Japan following the lead of Gaullist France and developing a nuclear capacity in the foreseeable future, the issue is one that cannot be avoided indefinitely. No doubt Japan would hesitate for a long time before taking the nuclear plunge; but it is conceivable that Japan might acquire nuclear weapons by the end of the century, particularly if the U.S. military presence in the western Pacific and on the Asian continent is significantly reduced.

Rich Country, Strong Army

Articles that have appeared in Japanese periodicals during 1980 suggest that the unfolding debate on defense involves three perspectives. At one end of the spectrum is the argument in favor of unarmed neutrality that has been the hallmark of the Japanese left-wing political parties since World War

II. At the other end is the argument articulated by Kataoka, favoring full-scale rearmament, including nuclear weapons. Somewhere in the middle is what seems to be, at least in the short term, a broad consensus in favor of a significant, but gradual, nonnuclear military build-up.

As the debate continues, the political parties will be striving to develop a national consensus on the basic issue of how Japan's security can best be assured. But the philosophical and psychological aspects of this issue cannot be avoided. A century ago the Japanese people adopted as their national watchword the phrase fukoku kyohei, a rich country and a strong army. At that time, the Japanese ruling class was confident that it had popular support for its determination to secure the independence and fullest possible economic and military development of Japan. In those days no one questioned the view that economic and military strength are linked and that one without the other is insufficient to secure the independence of a country. Perhaps this slogan from another century, once again enjoying currency among some Japanese politicians and business leaders and embedded in the Japanese collective unconscious, will lend an indirect impetus to Japanese rearmament, while security continues to be the public watchword.

The direction of Japanese foreign policy on the economic and political fronts appears most likely to be guided by what Japanese commentators have called "resource diplomacy." Resource diplomacy implies the development of closer political and economic ties with the countries that provide Japan with the raw materials it needs to operate its industries and maintain the standard of living of the Japanese people. This policy was evident during Ohira's visit to Australia and New Zealand in December 1979 when he spoke of "interdependence" and the need for Japan to establish a "creative partnership" with those countries. In a July 1980 interview published in the Japan Times, Suzuki reiterated this theme, pointing out what he viewed as the "necessity of aggressively promoting economic and natural resources diplomacy" as part of the overall policy of maintaining Japan's security.

Resource diplomacy has undoubtedly been the guiding influence in Japan's search for the establishment of closer relations with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. In 1978 former Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda became the first Japanese prime minister to visit the Middle East, as part of a continuing effort to improve Japan's relations with its oil suppliers. And, in a perceptible move away from the U.S. position, Japan has established contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). It also permits the PLO to maintain an office in Japan and supports the U.N. resolution that gives the PLO observer status.

The United States must learn how to treat Japan as a true equal.

In the case of the Soviet Union, Japan's attitude has been marked by ambivalence, and recently, by a notable coolness. Even though resource diplomacy led the Japanese to reaffirm their intention to cooperate with the USSR in future development of gas fields in Siberia and in exploration for oil off Sakhalin, Japan joined in the international chorus of condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and called on the Japan Olympic Committee to boycott the 1980 Olympic games. The Suzuki government, while continuing to press for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan (as well as from the Japanese-claimed northern islands off Hokkaido), has listed improvement of Japan's relations with the Soviet Union among its priority tasks.

Postwar relations with China began during the mid-1950s, when Japan began a series of cultural exchanges with the Chinese. Relations were normalized in 1972, and a peace treaty was concluded in 1978. Both events preceded the official recognition of China by the United States. On matters concerning China, the Japanese view themselves as competitors of the United States and have quickly laid claim to a special relationship with their giant neighbor, based on centuries of intercourse and an ethnic and cultural affinity. With two-way Sino-Japanese trade now running at a level of almost $9 billion annually, Japan can be expected to continue its efforts to strengthen its bilateral economic and cultural ties with China, while resisting any attempts to be viewed as part of a trilateral Sino-Japanese-American political or military alliance against the Soviet Union.

—Thomas Reed
Whereas geographic proximity and ethnic affinity are periodically stressed in the case of Japan's relations with Southeast Asia, resource diplomacy also appears to lurk behind Ohira's call early in 1979 for the establishment of a Pacific community grouping Japan and other Asian nations. The same can be said of the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine of cooperation between Japan and the Southeast Asian nations as "mutual partners."

The Suzuki government seems anxious to continue cultivating these ties with Asian nations. Thus, Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ito's first overseas trip took him to Thailand, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. In January 1981 Suzuki will make his first foreign visit to the Association of South East Asian Nations—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—to underscore the government's policy of giving priority to Asia. These nations have reacted with a mixture of outward cordiality and inner apprehension concerning Japan's future role in Asia. Memories of Japanese military domination still persist in some of these countries, notably in Indonesia and the Philippines, so that Japanese economic aid, trade, and investment will continue for some time to be viewed with a certain amount of suspicion and ambivalence.

The 1980s—A Crucible

The emergence of a politically independent Japan with strong nationalist tendencies will present the next U.S. administration with new challenges requiring bold policy initiatives. Therefore, one of the first priorities of the new administration should be a thorough re-examination of Japan's role in the world and of U.S. policy toward Japan.

No redefinition of U.S. policy can take place without a reconsideration of the U.S.-Japanese security treaty. More than anything else, this treaty symbolizes the lack of equality that a majority of the Japanese people perceive as characterizing their relationship with the United States. The treaty was conceived in 1950 when the United States was primarily concerned with the invasion of South Korea and with what it saw as a grave threat to its interests in North Asia by the Soviet Union and China. At that time, the Japanese were eager to see an official end to the U.S. occupation and the early restoration of self-rule. Against this background, Japan agreed to accept complete military reliance on the United States and the continued stationing of U.S. forces on its territory.

Since that time, the treaty has been a source of periodic friction between the United States and Japan. Today, although less than half the Japanese public supports continuation of the treaty in its present form, active opposition to the treaty is no longer as intense as it once was, and there is a reluctance to make an issue of it. Nevertheless, the treaty is an anachronism in the light of the political changes that have occurred in Asia and the world during its three decades of existence. In Asia itself, the power balance has changed. China no longer threatens the United States or Japan. Japan is a prosperous, highly industrialized nation, second only to the United States in economic strength. It has the capacity and political will to provide for its own defense to whatever degree it chooses, including the development of a nuclear deterrent. The permanent stationing of U.S. forces on Japanese territory can only be viewed as an anomaly—a temporary postwar phenomenon that has outlived its purpose.

Washington should enter into discussions with Tokyo that would lead to a phased withdrawal of U.S. troops from Japan.

The proposed U.S. withdrawal from South Korea was premature in 1976 precisely because U.S. policy makers were reluctant to address the central issue of the defense of Japan itself. This time the United States should start with the more important issue. Anticipating trends now at work in Japanese domestic politics, Washington should enter into discussions with Tokyo that would lead to a phased withdrawal of U.S. troops from Japan on a schedule that, without increasing pressure for the nuclear option, would permit Japan to assume its own defense. In other words, the time has come to phase out the U.S.-Japanese security treaty by mutual agreement and to replace it with an arrangement that takes into account not only U.S. strategic interests but also Japanese national interests and aspirations and those of other friendly Asian nations. The next decade will test U.S. willingness to countenance a new, independent Japan that has reaffirmed its indigenous value system and has adopted a more forceful role on the world stage. The acceptance of this new Japan will be easier if U.S. policy makers keep the following general points in mind:

• There are fundamental differences between Japan, an Oriental country, and the United States, a product of Western civilization—-differences in race, religion, language, and national character. It should not be assumed that because Japan has adapted certain Western political, economic, and social institutions to its own uses, it has changed its nature or has outgrown its historical and cultural affinity with Asia.

• Japan is not a static society. Major changes in mood and in self-perception are taking place there and are leading the Japanese to realize that Japan has moved out of America's shadow and is an important power in its own right. These changes will be gradual, as the Japanese build a national consensus on important issues of the day, but these changes will undoubtedly develop momentum in the 1980s. Americans need to be sensitive to them, keeping close watch on the undercurrents as well as the more obvious trends, so as to avoid being taken by surprise when changes finally manifest themselves. The United States can best influence Japanese thoughts and actions by providing friendly consultation and advice rather than by preaching or bullying.

• The relative economic and political strength of Japan, the United States, and the rest of the world has undergone fundamental changes during the past two decades. U.S. economic strength and political influence in the world have declined to the point where the emergence of an economically and militarily strong Japan, friendly to the United States, can be an asset to the West in its effort to prevent the further rise of Soviet influence, particularly in Asia.

• The United States must learn how to treat Japan as a true equal. Since the 1950s American policy makers have been fond of paying lip service to the notion of a U.S.-Japanese partnership, but this partnership has been more myth than reality. It is time to abandon this cliche and describe the relationship accurately—that is, friendly competitors whose interests require cooperation in many areas of vital common concern. Such cooperation should be on the basis of full equality, with close consultation on common concerns in areas such as the Middle East, the Korean peninsula, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, and Southeast Asia. It will require broad participation by officials at all levels of the two governments as well as by influential businessmen and scholars. It is naive to suppose that bilateral political relations can rest on something so ephemeral as a supposed friendship between the president of the United States and the prime minister of Japan.

• The United States needs to realize that its economic problems result from fundamental weaknesses in its own society and not from Japan's economic strength. The solution does not lie in pressure and protectionism, but rather in remedial steps to eliminate the internal causes for the U.S. economic decline. For the Japanese, the next decade will call for greater concern for the difficulties being experienced by other countries; greater contribution of their extraordinary talents—not just their money—to help solve global problems; and greater effort to take initiatives and communicate their particular views and interests to the rest of the world.

The Japanese communicate well among themselves, verbally and nonverbally. However, they have not yet learned to communicate well with the rest of the world. Therefore, they are perceived as essentially egoistic and passive, concerned only with their own well-being and reacting to international

•problems and the difficulties of others only when pressured to do so. The Japanese wittingly or unwittingly invite such pressure by constantly asking outsiders—particularly Americans—for advice as to what they should do. Instead, they should be more assertive in communicating their own views and judgments to the outside world.

The decade to come should see Japan emerge as an independent Asian power. In the past, when U.S. allies have moved toward greater independence, the result has often been misunderstanding, conflict, and antagonism. Japan and the United States cannot afford this price of change. Both Tokyo and Washington need to begin efforts now to adjust to a new relationship.

 



 

Japon Felsefesi

Japon Felsefesi

“Japon Felsefesi” teriminde “Japon” sözcüğü kültürel ya da tarihsel bir anlam taşımaktan çok etnik bir karakteri belirtmeyi amaçlar. Japon tininde felsefe bile henüz kendini "dünya"dan yalıtma geleneğine bağlı kalmayı sürdürür.

Japon düşüncesi düşüncenin kendisini düşünmez. Bu tinde "güzel bahar çiçekleri" vardır, ama bir güzellik ideası yoktur. Dünyada "devletler" vardır, ama bir devlet ideası yoktur. Bu evrenseller Japonya'nın yalnızca nirvana ile dolup taşan bilincine ancak Meiji döneminde girmeye başladı. Japon yazın eleştirmeni Kobayashi Hideo'ya (1902-1983) göre, Meiji dönemine dek Japonya'da "güzel kiraz çiçekleri" vardı, ama bir "güzellik" düşüncesi yoktu. Inamura Sanpaku (1758-1811) Hollandaca ad olarak "shoonheid/güzellik” ve sıfat olarak “schoon/güzel” sözcüklerinin her ikisini de Japonca'ya “birei” 素敵 sözcüğü ile çevirdi. "Bi" ve "rei" sözcükleri tarihsel olarak iyi, çekici olmasından ötürü övgüye değer görülen birşeyi anlatmak için kullanılıyordu ve sözcükler bunun dışında hoş, iyi, tatlı, sevimli, harika gibi ilgili ilgisiz pekçok başka anlamı da taşıyordu. Bunlar bütünüyle doğaldır ve insanda potansiyel güzellik algısı olduğuna göre ve Japon da bir homo sapiens olduğuna göre güzelliğe duyarsız olması olanaksızdır. Ama bütün bir Japon kültür tarihi kavram üzerine bir irdelemeden yoksun görünür ve sözcüğün kendisinin bir bakıma ilk kez oluşturulması gerekmiştir. Japon bunun dışında genel olarak felsefeden bütünüyle habersizdir, adalarda yalnızlık ve yalıtılmışlık içinde geçen iki bin yıl boyunca — “Hollanda incelemelerine” dek Batı dünyasının hiçbir bilimsel çalışması ile tanışmamıştır. Dünyasını rustik bir bakış açısından gördüklerinden daha öte betimlemesini sağlayacak kavramsal bir derinliği yoktur. Estetik, etik ve entellektüel kavramlar ile tanışmak için Meiji dönemini, daha doğrusu Commodor Matthew Perry'nin gelişini beklemek zorunda idi. Perry yanında her biri işler durumda olan bir lokomotif, telefon ve telgraf ile ve daha başka armağanlar getirdi, ama “düşünce” getirmeyi unuttu. Perry'nin pragmatizmi Japonların gerçek gereksinimlerinin düşünce ve özgürlük olduğunu, moral ve etik gelişim olmaksızın teknolojik gelişimin yalnızca samurai feodalizmini güçlendirmeye yarayacağını anlamasını önledi.

 

Varlıktan Kaçış Olarak “Japon Felsefesi”

"Dünya Felsefesi" denilen şeye katkıda bulunmak için yola çıkan "Japon Felsefesi" (ki etnik bir terim olarak geçerlidir) gerçekten de yapması gerektiği gibi felsefeye başından başlar ve herşeyi saltık Yokluk ya da Hiçlik ya da Boşluk kavramı üzerine kurmayı ister. Nirvana ilkesi terimlerinde yetişen bir kültür için bu doğaldır. Ama, ilk olarak, Nishida'nın yaptığı gibi Yokluğun dolaysızlığını ya da "saltık yokluğu" ileri sürerken onu Yerin (basho) yokluğu olarak alır ve böylece belirli bir yokluk yaptığını anlamaz. İkinci olarak, bu düşünme yolu, diyalektiğe yabancı bir düşüncenin doğallıkla yapması gerektiği gibi, Yokluğun kendisinin Varlık içerdiğini düşünmez ve bu iki karşıt terimi birbirinden saltık olarak ayırabileceğini kabul eder.


Japanese and Continental Philosophy / Conversations with the Kyoto School
edited by Bret W. Davis, Brian Schroeder, and Jason M. Wirth
Indiana University Press 2011


 

1 Contributions to Dialogue with the Kyoto School
Ueda Shizuteru

The Core of the Kyoto School:
Nishida’s Nothingness and Nishitani’s Emptiness

"... in the intellectual tradition behind Nishida and Nishitani, nothingness (mu) is not only non-being (hi-u) as the negation of being (u), but also contains a sense that goes beyond this, and this “additional sense” is brought to life when the originariness of nothingness is existentially realized and thoughtfully cultivated. When nothingness is limited to non-being as the negation of being, it is restricted to the horizon of being. Nothingness does not then tear through the horizon of being (which includes non-being), but rather, on the basis of what might be called a transcendental ontological preeminence of being, it is from the start posited as what can be comprehended in terms of non-being "

"Nishida Kitarō and Tanabe Hajime frst developed philosophies based on the idea that the absolute must be thought in terms of nothingness. Tne fundamental category of their philosophies was therefore “absolute nothingness” (zettai-mu)."

"Despite their commonalities, there are also differences between Nishida’s and Tanabe’s conceptions of “absolute nothingness.” While Nishida’s conceived of it in terms of “place” (basho), Tanabe’s conceived of it in terms of “praxis” (jissen).

"Nishitani, who began to philosophize thirty years afer Nishida did, faced a different problem, a problem which was increasingly shaking the spiritual and intellectual ground of the world. Nishitani wrote: “Te space for a primordial relation with the transcendent is closing, and because of this the world and human existence are becoming fundamentally meaningless and aimless. Tis condition is lurking at the base of the way of being of modern civilization and human being. Such a situation is what is called the arrival of nihilism.” (NCK 11: 163)

 



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